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WORLD TRADE LAW AFTER DOHA: MULTILATERAL,
REGIONAL, AND NATIONAL APPROACHES
DAVID A. GANTZ*
I. INTRODUCTION
After ten years, the Doha Development Round is effectively dead,
at least in its present form, even if no one seems willing to affirm its
passing in so many words for fear of being blamed for its demise.I At
best, "the Doha Rounds seems likely to lapse into an indefinite period of
hibernation - with little idea of when or how the talks could be
wakened." 2 Doha will not likely again be a comprehensive single
undertaking, and it is unlikely that a broadly comprehensive round of
trade negotiations reminiscent of Doha or the Uruguay Round will be
attempted in the foreseeable future. Although some have suggested a
"time out," with resumption only after political leadership changes in
the United States and China, in 2013,3 there is little reason at this
writing, with the inability of the Ministers at the WTO's 8th Ministerial
Meeting in December 2011 to resurrect the Doha Round, 4 to believe
that a few years' delay would make a major breakthrough in the
negotiations possible. While some have suggested that Doha's demise
* Samuel M. Fegtly Professor of Law and Director, International Trade and Business Law
Program, the University of Arizona, James E. Rogers College of Law. Copyright© 2011,
David A. Gantz.
1. Alan Beattie, WTO: World waits to move on after Doha, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 22,
2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/al8aeb76-ded3-1leO-a228-00144feabdcO.html#axzzlk
EYD2juG.
2. JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, THE DOHA DILEMMA: IMPLICATIONS FOR KOREA AND THE
MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM 1 (2011) [hereinafter SCHOTT I], available at
http://www.piie.com/publications/papers/schott20110926.pdf.
3. Jeffrey J. Schott, What Should the United States do About Doha?, PB11-8
PETERSON INST. FOR INT'L ECONOMICS 3 (2011), available at http://www.iie.com
/publications/pb/pbl1-08.pdf.
4. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Conference: Chairman's Concluding
Statement of 17 December 2011, WT[MIN (11)/11 (2011) [hereinafter Schott II], available
at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/minist e/minl1e/minl1 11 e.doc (reaffirming
the Members' commitment to WTO principles but reflecting no progress on the Doha
agenda, or other achievements other than approving membership for Russia, Samoa and
Montenegro).
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threatens the continued existence of the GATT/WTO system, 5 many
more see continued strength in the system as developed over the past
nearly sixty-five years, with its extensive body of rules and a mandatory
dispute settlement system that, despite its flaws, works reasonably
well, and consider it unlikely that the binding rules that have been
negotiated in prior GATT rounds will atrophy. 6 Even with some risks of
backsliding and increasing protectionism many nations, the United
States, the European Union (EU), Japan, Brazil, China, and India,
among others, have far too much to lose to make abandoning the WTO
rules or even departing substantially from them a rational option.
Thus, the WTO system, with its inefficiencies and deficiencies (of which
there are many7), is here to stay.
Over the past twenty-five years, international trade expanded in a
robust manner,. outpacing world population by about 5 percent,
compared to 1 percent from 1870 to 1950.8 Between 1994 and 2006,
world merchandise trade increased each year except for 2001, in
amounts ranging from approximately 10 percent in 1997, 2000, and
2004, to only 3.5 percent in 2002.9 While world trade rules undoubtedly
facilitated this growth, other factors, including trade in components as
a result of just-in-time manufacturing processes and the revolution in
shipping brought about by the containerization phenomenon, as well as
some of the more successful regional trade agreements (RTOs) such as
the EU and NAFTA, also contributed. 10 Perhaps Doha has been a
victim of the success of prior GATT negotiating rounds, because of the
5. Viv Davies, The Future of Doha and the WTO: a CEPR trade seminar, Vox, Apr.
27, 2011, http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/6431 (stating "Failure of the Doha
Round will create a dangerous situation in the WTO . . ." according to Peter Sutherland).
6. See SANDRA POLASKI, WHAT FUTURE FOR THE WTO? 3 (L'Economie Politique ed.,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace trans., 2007) (arguing that existing WTO
rules will still set trade rules for major players) [hereinafter POLASKI].
7. Various members have complained, inter alia, about alleged US abuse of the
antidumping laws; unfairness of the dispute settlement mechanism for small developing
countries; US and EU agricultural subsidies; major developing country markets
(particularly China, India and Brazil) to imports of both agricultural and manufactured
products from other Members); extraordinarily high tariffs imposed by many countries on
a variety of agricultural and non -agricultural products); insufficiently "special and
differential treatment" of imports from developing countries, particularly the least-
developed countries; and continued tariff and non-tariff restrictions to textile, apparel and
footwear imports from developing country members.
8. See Uri Dadush, The Future of the World Trading System, INT'L EcONOMIC
BULLETIN, July 14, 2010 [hereinafter Dadush], available at http://www.carnegie
endowment.org/2010/07/1 4/future-of-world-trading-system/45b.
9. POLASKI, supra note 6, at 4.
10. MARC LEVINSON, THE Box: HOW THE SHIPPING CONTAINER MADE THE WORLD
SMALLER AND THE WORLD ECONOMY BIGGER 272-73 (Princeton University Press 2006).
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extent of liberalization except with regard to agricultural subsidies,
sensitive agricultural goods, and certain manufactured products."
The last several decades have also been a time of fundamental
change to the global trading system. The "Quad" countries (the United
States, EU, Japan, and Canada) no longer dominate the negotiations.
China (since November 2001), Brazil, India, Indonesia, and South
Africa in particular are major players without whose concurrence little
can be accomplished in Geneva.12 This trend will likely continue, as it
is estimated that in twenty years or so, ten of the largest economies will
be what we currently regard as developing countries, and China will
likely be almost every WTO Member's largest trading partner. 13 Peter
Sutherland, the last secretary general of GATT, states bluntly that
because China is the "world's most successful trading nation and will
remain so for a long while . . . China [is] the key player in the World
Trade Organization."14 Less significant change is likely for most other
developing countries, which despite increasing their share of world
trade are likely to remain poor. 15
The Doha process has also been plagued by a confluence of negative
political factors in the United States, the EU, India, and elsewhere.
The expiry of Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) in the United States in
mid-2007 and divided government since 2010 have made continued
negotiations more difficult, given that most nations are reluctant to
conclude trade agreements with the United States unless they are
assured (as TPA provides) that Congress cannot unilaterally change the
agreement. 16 Elections in India in 2009 likely contributed to the failure
of progress in the negotiations in 2008, as did Brazil's more recent
defensive approach toward rapidly increasing imports from China and
currency appreciation at home. 1' A similar problem has been the
inward focus of those and other developing nations, for which reducing
poverty remains a major focus of government policy and actions.18 If
one adds Japan's on-going political paralysis, the EU's focus on internal
debate about the Eurozone and a stagnant regional economy and
implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, and China's reluctance to accept
11. SCHOTT I, supra note 2, at 2.
12. IAN F. FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32645, THE DOHA DEVELOPMENT
AGENDA: THE WTO FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT 2 (2005).
13. See Dadush, supra note 8.
14. Peter Sutherland, A Future for the World Trade Organisation?, in JAN TUMLR
POLICY ESSAYS 1, 2 (2010), available at http://www.ecipe.org/publications/jan-tumlir-
policy-essays/a-future-for-the-world-trade-organisation/PDF.
15. Id. at 7.
16. 19 U.S.C. §§ 3803-05 (2004).
17. Susan Schwab, After Doha: Why the Negotiations are Doomed and What we
Should do About It, 90 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 104, 111 (2011) [hereinafter Schwab].
18. See Dadush, supra note 8 (arguing that reducing income gaps are much more
important than a free trade offensive).
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the full responsibilities of WTO membership and world economic power
status (likely in part as a result of a coming leadership transition),19
there has arguably been a perfect storm of extreme political caution
among the major players in the negotiations.
If there is reason for cautious optimism post-Doha it is because
there are alternatives to a broad package of new or amended WTO
agreements. These alternatives while less than ideal may nevertheless
provide an impetus for continuing trade liberalization both among
specific countries and in some instances worldwide. Such possibilities
include existing and future "plurilateral" trade agreements (specialized
agreements among willing Members but not the entire membership,
such as the WTO's Government Procurement Agreement and the
Information Technology Agreement), hundreds of regional trade
agreements (RTAs), and various national laws and regulations in the
soon to be 156 member nations of the WTO. 20
I begin in Part II by reviewing briefly the evolution of the world
trading system since 1947, along with the major reasons for Doha's
failure and for the widespread belief that a broad agenda of "single
undertaking" negotiations cannot be recreated in the foreseeable future.
Part III discusses the specific areas in which relatively widespread
international agreement may be reached, including information
technology, trade facilitation, government procurement, services,
fisheries subsidies, and treatment of state owned enterprises (SOEs).
Part IV discusses the historical development, current state and likely
future expansion of RTAs, while Part V addresses the importance of
national, largely unilateral trade liberalization through tariff and non-
tariff barrier reduction such as that which has recently taken place in
Chile and Mexico, and may well be more common, even in the United
States and the EU and even in the agricultural sector.21
When trying to assess the future, I have focused on the relatively
near term, primarily the coming five to ten years. Predictions beyond
that period are fraught with peril in the international trade area as in
most others. I doubt that anyone, and certainly not I, has a crystal ball
that would give an accurate reading forty or even twenty years hence.
Among other constraints are the impossibility of assessing the impact of
unexpected events ranging from a nuclear bomb or other catastrophic
19. Schwab, supra note 17, at 108.
20. Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/
thewto e/whatis-e/tif.e/org6_e.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2012).
21. See Agricultural Committees Devising Proposal to cut $23 Billion in Spending,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE'S WORLD TRADE ONLINE, Oct. 17, 2011, available at
http://insidetrade.com/201110172379317/WTO-Daily-News/Daily-News/agriculture-commi
ttees-devising-proposal-to-cut-23-billion-in-spending/menu-id-173.html (last visited Oct.
18, 2011) (discussing plans because of budgetary pressures to reduce agricultural
subsidies).
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attack in a developed country by a terrorist group to economic and
social dislocation resulting from much more rapid climate change than
experts currently anticipate, to a decline in Chinese economic growth on
the one hand or a reversal of the economic decline of Europe and the
United States on the other. 22
As others have pointed out, "the WTO is an integral part of the
world trading system, but it is only one part . . . ."23 There is
insufficient political will to conclude the Doha Round. It remains to be
seen whether, among the willing trading nations, there exists the
necessary political foresight to assure that the process of expanding
world trade through the reduction of trade and non-trade barriers will
continue well into the 21st Century. If such will exists there are tools
other than a major WTO negotiating round to achieve such goals.
II. WORLD TRADE AS OF THE END OF 2011
The GATT 1947, as modified and expanded in eight major
multilateral rounds culminating with the Uruguay Round's Marrakesh
Agreement in April 1994,24 resulted by 2000 (when the Uruguay Round
tariff concessions were fully implemented) in an aggregate reduction of
tariffs imposed by developed countries of approximately 40 percent and
for developing countries of 20 percent compared to pre-Uruguay Round
levels. 25 Beginning with the completion of the Tokyo Round in 1978,
rules relating to a number of non-tariff areas, such as dumping,
subsidies, government procurement, and customs valuation were added
as "codes," albeit on a plurilateral basis. 26
The watershed event for the world trading system was the
completion of seven and a half years of negotiations that resulted in the
Uruguay Round agreements, which became effective for most then-
existing GATT Contracting Parties in 1995.27 The Uruguay Round
constituted a massive expansion of the international system, by adding
to the GATT trade in goods disciplines; trade in services; trade-related
intellectual property; limited coverage of trade-related investment;
coverage of agriculture, textiles, sanitary and phytosanitary measures
22. A game of catch up, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 24, 2011, http://www.economist
.com/node/21528979.
23. Dadush, supra note 8.
24. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994,
1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter WTO Agreement], available at http://www.wto.org
/english/docs ellegal-e/legal-e.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2011).
25. MARK R. SANDSTROM, JULIA M. CHEUNG & MICHELLE D. LYNCH, THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION 122-23 (Terrence P. Stewart, ed., 1996).
26. See The Tokyo Round "Codes," WORLD TRADE ORG., available at http://www.wto.
org/english/thewto e/ministe/min98_e/slide_e/tokyo.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2011).
27. The Uruguay Round, WORLD TRADE ORG., available at http://www.wto.org/
english/thewto-e/whatis-e/tif e/fact5 e.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2011).
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and standards; and a mandatory dispute settlement system. 28
Moreover, disciplines which under the Tokyo Round were optional, such
as those relating to dumping, subsidies, and customs valuation, were no
longer so after the Uruguay Round. Also, discretionary plurilateral
agreements applicable to government procurement, civil aviation, dairy
products, and bovine meat were included in the Uruguay Round
package. 29
While this expansion has proven relatively easy to understand and
implement for developed countries, the additional obligations,
particularly in the areas of intellectual property and services, imposed
enormous burdens on developing nation administrative agencies and
the courts, among others. Even with long grace periods - India and
other least developed WTO members were not required to fully
implement the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property (TRIPS) for ten years after January 1, 1995 (recently extended
to 2013 and likely to be extended further)3 o - the burdens of full
compliance were and are substantial, factors which have clearly
influenced the reluctance of some developing countries to move forward
again under Doha.
The United States and the EU, very unwisely in retrospect, sought
at a WTO Ministerial Meeting in Seattle in 1999 to obtain agreement to
kick off yet another negotiating round. 31 The effort was a miserable
failure going well beyond street demonstrations, in part because the
majority of the Members were still experiencing grave difficulties in
implementing the obligations they had accepted in the Marrakech
Agreement, and neither the United States nor the EU had in the
preliminary sessions shown much willingness to include on the agenda
issues of importance to developing country members, such as alleged
United States abuses of the Anti-dumping Agreement. 32 Perhaps the
most significant result of the Seattle meeting was confirmation that
world trade negotiations would no longer be dominated by the United
28. Id.; see also WTO Agreement supra note 24, Annex 2, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/28-dsu.pdf.
29. WTO Agreement, supra note 24, Annex 4, available at http://www.wto.org/
englishldocs-ellegal-e/legal-e.htm.
30. See WTO Agreement supra note 24, Annex 1(c), art. 66, available at http://www.
wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/27-trips.pdf.
31. Press Release: Office of the United States Trade Representative in Washington
D.C., WORLD TRADE ORG., available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist-e/
min99_e/english/press-e/ustr e.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2012).
32. David A. Gantz, Failed Efforts to Initiate the "Millennium Round" in Seattle:
Lessons for Future Global Trade Negotiations, 17 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 349, 351 (2000)
(discussing the Seattle meeting and the reasons for its failure).
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States, EU, Japan, and Canada but that major developing nations,
particularly Brazil, India, and South Africa, would play a major role. 3 3
The time of initiation of the Doha Round, in November 2011, was
no coincidence. Built-in incentives to initiate the Round came in part
from several of the Uruguay Round Agreements, including the General
Agreement on Trade in Services and the Agreement on Agriculture,
because both incorporated in their texts' obligations (beginning in 2000)
to continue expanding the disciplines in those fields. 34 A spirit of unity
briefly following 9/11, the negotiating skills of United States Trade
Representative Robert Zoellick and WTO Secretary General Mike
Moore, and labeling the round the "Doha Development Round" probably
helped bring about the accord, given that many of the developing
country members, after seven years operating under the WTO
agreements, felt that they had not received the benefits they expected
from the package.35 The labeling also reflected reality; developing
members were and are a substantial majority of the WTO Members and
thus could determine in 2001 whether new trade rules would be
attempted.36 In retrospect, the declaration, with fifty-two paragraphs
covering a broad variety of procedural and substantive areas, was
overly optimistic and perhaps naive. 37
From the outset there were signs that the negotiations would be
difficult. The developing world was skeptical about the willingness of
the major developed countries to offer major concessions in such areas
as agricultural subsidies without asking for painful concessions in
return. The "Singapore Issues" of investment, anti-competition rules,
trade facilitation, and transparency in government procurement (the
latter shorthand for corruption) were included in the Doha Declaration
but never accepted by a majority of the members, and dropped
completely from the negotiations a few years later. 38
After six or so years of negotiations it became apparent that
disagreements between key developed nations such as the United
States and the EU on the one hand, and the largest developing
33. See China and the WTO, WORLD TRADE ORG., available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/countriese/china-e.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2011)
(stating China did not become a member until December 11, 2001).
34. See Understanding the WTO, WORLD TRADE ORG., 80-81 (2011), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/tif e/understanding.e.pdf.
35. RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY AND
PRACTICE 61-63 (Lexis Nexis ed., 3d ed., 2008).
36. POLASKI, supra note 6, at 2-3.
37. See generally World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 Nov. 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Ministerial Declaration],
available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/minist e/min0le/mindecl-e.htm.
38. See The Doha Declaration Explained: Relationship between Trade and
Investment, WORLD TRADE ORG., available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/ddael
dohaexplained-e.htm#investment.
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countries, including Brazil, China, and India, had become impossible to
bridge. Nor, by 2007, was there agreement between the United States
and the EU on reduction of agricultural subsidies, while Brazil, on
behalf of the "G20" developing country Members, insisted on
substantial reductions. 39 India, on behalf of the "G33" countries whose
agricultural sectors were dominated by small farmers, sought to shield
20 percent of its agricultural tariffs on "special products." 40
Manufactured goods tariffs have been similarly controversial, with the
United States and the EU seeking such tariffs (non-agricultural market
access or "NAMA") of no more than 10 percent for developed countries
and no more than 15 percent for developing countries. 41 Developed
members believed that better market access for both agricultural and
manufactured exports, and for key services such as those in the
financial and telecommunications areas, were the only means to
securing domestic support for further concessions on agricultural
subsidies and additional tariff reductions. Argentina, Brazil, China,
India, South Africa, and other developing nations adamantly refused.42
The negotiations were also complicated by the fact that despite
common positions in public the developing country members' interests
were hardly monolithic. Not only the United States and the EU would
have benefitted from greater market access for both agricultural and
manufactured goods to these major developing country markets;
smaller and poorer developing countries will suffer economically
(probably much more than the United States and the EU) from China,
Brazil and India's intransigence. 4 3 It was only late in the process that a
few middle-income developing countries such as Chile, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Singapore advocated more
market-opening measures by the dominant developing countries, with
harsh criticism from them the result.44
Also, although the criticism has seldom been articulated by
member governments in public, concerns in such countries as
Argentina, Brazil, and generally MERCOSUR over rapidly increasing
imports from China alone may well have contributed to their own and
other developing members' reluctance to reduce tariffs on a most-
39. CHARLES E. HANRAHAN & RANDY SCHNEPF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33144,
WTO DOHA ROUND: THE AGRICULTURAL NEGOTIATIONS 2 (2007).
40. POLASKI, supra note 6, at 5.
41. Ian F. Fergusson, The World Trade Organization: The Non-Agricultural Market
Access (NAMA) Negotiations, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress 2
(2011), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33634 2011011 1.pdf.
42. Id. at 10.
43. Schwab, supra note 17, at 107-08.
44. Id. at 108.
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favored-nation (MFN) basis, 45 as is reflected in a recent series of highly
protectionist, if understandable, actions by those two countries designed
to reduce Chinese imports.46
Ultimately, the divergent interests of developed countries, major
developing countries and the least developed countries could not be
adequately bridged. It seems unlikely that this central impasse can be
resolved in the foreseeable future, or perhaps even in a decade. 47 Add
to this the leadership vacuum among developed nations; the multi-polar
system divide noted above; the developed country view of the new
economic powerhouses as more economic rivals than export
destinations; and the sheer complexities of addressing issues as
services, investment and agricultural subsidies, the probabilities for
future success under the current single-undertaking and consensus-
based WTO system seem slight indeed.48 While the WTO will continue
to play an important role, both in enforcing current international
trading rules and in selected areas where consensus or broad, if not
universal, agreement is possible (Part III, below), the WTO's status as
the focal point for trade liberalization is likely to further erode as it has
for much of the past decade.
III. FUTURE TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN GENEVA
The post-Doha opportunities in Geneva likely include those where a
consensus may be possible, and those where "plurilateral" agreements
among only the willing are legally and politically achievable. Other
broadly-based international measures relating to trade, such as those
implemented regionally and through adoption of model laws, are
discussed in Parts IV and V, below.
A. Areas of Possible Consensus
There appear to be very few areas where broad consensus among
the WTO membership will be achievable in the foreseeable future,
beyond largely tariff-free and quota-free developed market access for
least developed member (LDC) exports, subsidies to industrial fishing
fleets, trade facilitation measures and, somewhat less likely,
elimination of tariffs and tariff barriers for "green" technologies. Under
the WTO Agreement, adoption of new agreements and amendments is
45. See Aaditya Mattoo, Francis Ng & Arvind Subramanin, The Elephant in the
"Green Room" China and the Doha Round, PB11-8, PETERSON INST. FOR INT'L
ECONOMICS 3 (2011), available at http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb I1-03.pdf.
46. Keep Out: South America's two biggest economies are imposing heavy-handed
trade restrictions, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 24, 2011, http://www. economist.com/node/
21530136; see also David Haskel, Mercosur Plans to Raise Import Duties to Counter
Avalanche of Predatory Exports,'29 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 25 (Jan. 5, 2012).
47. Dadush, supra note 8 (suggesting that this could take 25 years or more).
48. Id.
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possible in most cases with a vote of two-thirds of the membership. 9
However, in practice the more customary consensus rule has usually
been followed. Consensus does not mean that all members must
support a measure or agreement, but if even one objects strenuously, as
Georgia did earlier with regard to Russia's desired WTO accession
(later resolved with approval of Russia's accession in December 2011),50
all progress is blocked. At the same time, for arrangements that do not
result in tariff reductions, the plurilateral route may be an option (part
B of this section).
1. Trade Barriers for LDCs
Tariff-free, quota-free access could be provided to developed
member markets for most or all manufactured goods from the LDC
members - generally all members with annual per-capita GDPs of
under $1000, with a few possible exceptions such as Vietnam. These
proposals have been under discussion at least since the 2005 Hong
Kong WTO Ministerial meeting, 5' when "developed-country Members,
and developing-country Members declaring themselves in a position to
do so, agreed to implement duty-free and quota-free market access for
manufactured products originating from LDCs," but have not yet been
implemented (except unilaterally to some extent by the EU).5 2 Support
for the plan is not universal, since discrimination would effectively
occur against lower middle income countries that do not qualify as
LDCs but compete for access in developed country markets with LDCs,
and the practical lines between so-called middle income and lower
middle income developing countries and LDCs may be blurred. This is a
serious problem if the implementation of the plan were to be followed by
a reduction of the availability of benefits now available to all developing
countries under the Generalized System of Preferences and similar
regional programs.5 3 Whether members such as the United States and
the EU would allow expanded access, even for LDCs, for sensitive
49. WTO Agreement, supra note 24, Annex 1(a), art. X, available at http://www.wto.
org/english/docs-e/legal-e/19-adp.pdf (The actual vote under the WTO Agreement, art. X.
Article X(3) also provides in pertinent part that an amendment "shall take effect for the
Members that have accepted them upon acceptance by two thirds of the Members and
thereafter for each other Member upon acceptance by it").
50. See Daniel Pruzin & Eric J. Lyman, Russian Accession Bid Clears WTO, but
Duma's Ratification Postponed, 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 2055 (Dec. 22, 2011).
51. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 18 December 2005,
WT/MIN(05)/DEC (2005), available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/minist e/
minO5_e/finaltexte.htm#ldc (listing the covered goods in para. 47, Annex F).
52. Id.
53. Generalized System of Preferences, 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(2)(D) (2002); See also
Andean Trade Preference and Drug Eradication Act ("ATPDEA"), 19 U.S.C. § 3201 (2002)
and the Caribbean Basin Initiative ("CBI"), 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2707 (2001).
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products such as textiles and apparel is also problematic, 54 particularly
when the program would be seen by domestic politicians as unilateral,
without any corresponding benefits accruing to developed country
exporters. Should exceptions be incorporated for apparel and footwear
tariff lines, for example, the economic benefits of the plan for LDCs
would be substantially eroded.
2. Industrial Fishing Subsidies
Broad but not unanimous support also exists for ending subsidies
to industrial fishing fleets, primarily on environmental/protection of
species grounds, but also to protect smaller coastal fishing industries.
As outlined by the WTO Secretariat,
The proposed new disciplines on fisheries subsidies as reflected
in the Chairman's first draft text would include a prohibited
category covering, inter alia, subsidies for construction of new
fishing vessels and subsidies for operating costs of fishing.
LDCs would be exempted from the new disciplines, and other
developing Members would have substantial flexibilities,
especially for subsidies to subsistence-type fishing in their
territorial waters. All exceptions to the proposed prohibition
would be conditioned on compliance with certain provisions
related to fisheries management. 55
Discussions have been underway in Geneva since early 2002, with
the major players, apparently relatively near agreement, under
pressure not only from developing country coastal fishing industries but
by environmentally minded NGOs and civil society groups in the United
States, the EU, and other developed nations. However, there appears
to be little reported progress since the end of 2009.56
3. Trade Facilitation
Few members openly oppose so-called "trade facilitation" measures,
reducing the costs of physically moving goods across national borders,
which some experts estimate could increase global GDP by over $100
billion annually.5 7 This increased level of interest reflects in large part
the success of the GATT/WTO system in reducing tariff levels and non-
tariff-barriers since 1947; in many markets trade is likely more
54. See SCHOTT I, supra note 2, at 8 (noting that legislation would be required to
avoid blocking access by such barriers as restrictive rules of origin).
55. Introduction to Fisheries Subsidies in the WTO, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.orglenglish/tratop-e/rulesneg.e/fish-e/fish intro-e.htm (last visited Oct.
19, 2011).
56. Id.
57. Schwab, supra note 17, at 115 (quoting the Peterson Institute).
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restricted by border delays and infrastructure limitations and excessive
regulation than by tariffs. Exports as well as imports would be
facilitated, a factor that for the most part reduces opposition by national
business groups. Since any agreement is likely to be coupled with
strong commitments of financial and technical assistance toward such
"capacity building" in achieving the objectives of the agreement (as has
been the case with some regional trade agreements),58 it is likely to
receive broad support from the developing members who would receive
the assistance.
4. "Green" Technology
As part of the Doha Round the WTO members have been engaged
in negotiations which if successful would eliminate tariff and non-tariff
barriers for trade in "green" technology products and services. There
has been no agreement to date; the United States, as the major
proponent, has asked WTO members to freeze current tariffs first on
155 then, as a compromise, on 25 "green" tariff lines, but to date Brazil
and India have refused. 59 Of course, under the MFN principle, if the
United States and other proponents were to eliminate tariffs on "green"
goods all other WTO members, including China, would benefit.
Similarly, MFN obligations reduce the option of discriminatory
application of reductions in services market access.60
Despite disagreements and game-playing with the lists of products
to be covered, 61 some have argued that an accord on green technologies
might be possible separately from the Doha package. 62
However, it is difficult not to be skeptical, given that China, as of
early 2010, became the world's largest producer of both wind turbines
and solar panels allegedly through currency manipulation and WTO
illegal subsidies. 63 It seems unlikely under these circumstances that
the United States president (whoever he or she may be as of January
58. Central American-Dominican Republic-United States Free Trade Agreement,
U.S.-CAFTA-DR, Aug. 5, 2004, 19 U.S.C.A. § 4000, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta/final-
text (illustrating for example CAFTA-DR Chapter 5, on "customs administration and
trade facilitation" contains a statement in art. 5.12 that "The Parties recognize the
importance of trade capacity building activities in facilitating the implementation of this
Chapter").
59. Daniel Pruzin, Hopes Fading for WTO 'Deliverables' Deal As Delegations Take
Hard Line on LDC-Plus, 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1164 (Jul. 14, 2011).
60. See WTO Agreement supra note 24, Annex 2, art. III, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/28-dsu.pdf.
61. Schott II, supra note 3, at 4.
62. Schwab, supra note 17, at 115.
63. Keith Bradsher, China Leading Global Race to Make Clean Energy, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 30, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/31/business/energy-environment/31
renew.html.
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2013) and Congress would continue an initiative to facilitate entry of
Chinese green technology goods into the United States without China
making major concessions as well. Even should China agree to open its
markets to foreign products, which it has refused to date, 64 unless the
tariff reductions were accompanied by changes in mandatory transfer of
technology rules in China and agreement not to subsidize production of
such goods, China's acceptance into such an accord seems a total non-
starter. A decision in November 2011 by the United States Department
of Commerce to initiate a countervailing duty investigation of Chinese
solar subsidies makes such an agreement even less likely in the
foreseeable future. 65
B. Agreements among the Willing
With the exceptions noted above, broadly based (but not universally
applicable) progress is more likely to be achieved through plurilateral
agreements comprised only of the members who are willing to accept
the obligations in order to reap the benefits, whether undertaken within
the WTO or separately. As one scholar has observed, "many complex
issues, including services, investment, agricultural subsidies, and the
import of manufactures in developing countries, remain de facto outside
the WTO's reach."6 6 Some of these may be effectively beyond any broad
international accord even on a plurilateral basis, and thus destined only
for treatment in RTAs (since only the latter permits departure from
MFN principles absent a WTO waiver),67 but others seem more
promising.
The practical ability of nations who are WTO members to reduce
tariffs further for a group smaller than the full membership is limited,
in contrast to doing so via a negotiating round in Geneva, because any
such tariff reductions must be offered on a MFN basis, whether or not
the beneficiaries of the reductions are part of the bargain, absent a
waiver from the membership. 68 This "free rider" problem makes such
reductions problematic. Fortunately, if there is adequate political will
there are other possibilities, the most promising of which include
further refinements in the existing GPA and the Information
Technology Agreement (ITA), where negotiations have been taking
place in Geneva for some time. Other possibilities include further
efforts at anti-competition and investment rules - although those are
64. US, China Solar Tensions Threaten to Eclipse Environmental Trade Talks, 15
BRIDGES WEEKLY TRADE NEWS DIGEST 38 (2011), available at http://ictsd.org/il
news/bridgesweekly/1 17948//.
65. Id.
66. Dadush, supra note 8 (emphasis added).
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likely long term rather than medium term aspirations - and protection
of intellectual property that goes beyond the current TRIPS. 69
1. Expanded Government Procurement Agreement (GPA)
After initial discussions at the OECD, government procurement
was included in the Tokyo Round GATT negotiations, resulting in the
conclusion of a Government Procurement Code (GPC). The GPC
entered into force in 1981 and was amended in 1988; at that time it
covered only central government procurement and only goods, not
services. 70 Like the other Uruguay Round Codes it was not mandatory
for GATT Contracting Parties.7 1 The plurilateral Uruguay Round, GPA
became effective January 1, 1996.72 The GPA's membership as of
October 2011 included forty-one nations, including the twenty-seven
members of the European Union.73 New applications for membership
include China, Jordan, the Ukraine, and six others.74
As explained by the WTO, "[t]he GPA is based on the principles of
openness, transparency and non-discrimination, which apply to Parties'
procurement covered by the Agreement, to the benefit of Parties and
their suppliers, goods and services." 75 Government procurement of
goods and services is an important sector in most economies, accounting
for 15-20 percent of GDP. 76 The dream of a GPA that would include
Brazil, China, India, Russia, and South Africa (BRICS) is likely some
69. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 33
I.L.M. 1197, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, available at http://www.wto.org/english/res-e/booksp-e/
analytic-index e/trips e.htm.
70. Overview of the Agreement on Government Procurement, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/gproc e/gpa-overview-e.htm (last visited Jan. 18,
2012); The Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 11, 1979, GATT Doc.
MTN/NTM/211/Rev.2, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1052, available at www.wto.
org/gatt docs/EnglishlSULPDF/91990048.pdf.
71. Overview of the Agreement on Government Procurement, supra note 70.
72. Id.; The Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 4(b), 1915 U.N.T.S. 105
[hereinafter GPA].
73. The others include Armenia, Hong Kong, Iceland, Israel, Japan, South Korea,
Lichtenstein, Aruba (Netherlands), Norway, Singapore, Switzerland, Chinese, Taipei and
the United States. Parties and Observers to the GPA, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto
.org/english/tratop-e/gproc e/memobs_e.htm#parties (last visited Jan. 18, 2012).
74. Int'l Centre for Trade and Sustainable Dev. (ICTSD), Finish Line "Clearly in
Sight" for WTO Govt Procurement Deal: Chair, 15 BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG. no.
35, at 3 (2011) [hereinafter ICTSD - GPA], available at http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridges
weekly/116637/.
75. The Plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/gproc-e/gp.gpa-e.htm.
76. ICTSD - GPA, supra note 74, at 2. The WTO secretariat suggests that the value
of an expanded GPA with additional coverage and members would be worth $380-$970
billion worth of trade annually. Id. (referencing a WTO working paper).
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years away, since China is the only one of the five now seeking
membership, and Russia will likely complete the WTO accession
process only in mid-2012. 77
The GPA contains requirements for further negotiations after the
first three years in force and "periodically thereafter"78 and such
negotiations were incorporated into the Doha Round.79 While
provisional agreement on a revised GPA was reached in September
2006 as part of the Doha Round, the negotiations have continued into
December 2011, where agreement was finally reached.80 The
negotiators sought to add more than 200 listed government ministries
and agencies, as well as sub-central entities, to members' annexes that
would be newly subject to the GPA, as well as full coverage of
construction services; 81 over 150 were ultimately agreed upon. 82 Among
the most difficult outstanding issues was EU dissatisfaction with
Japanese and United States proposals on future commitments for
liberalized public procurement and the future GPA work program. 83
The EU has also been pressuring the United States to add more central
government entities to those covered (with twelve added in the new
accord), and to expand United States coverage beyond the current
thirty-seven. 84 This suggests that the GPA discussions will continue
well into the future with expansion of both commitments and
membership. Other changes including updating that would take into
account the increasing use of on-line advertising for tenders and
electronic procurement. In an effort to attract more developing country
members, longer implementation provisions and more individually
tailored accession protocols would be offered. 5 The negotiators also
rejected efforts by some members to withdraw concessions granted in
77. Id.; Ministerial Conference Approves Russia's WTO Membership, WORLD TRADE
ORG. (Dec. 16,2011), http://www.wto.org/englishInews-e/ news11 e/acc rus_16dec11_e.htm.
78. GPA, supra note 72, art. XXIV(7).
79. Id.
80. The Plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement, supra note 75; Daniel
Pruzin, Negotiators Clinch WTO Procurement Deal; Expanded Access Valued at $80-100
Billion, 28 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 2043 (Dec. 22, 2011) [hereinafter Pruzin -
Procurement Deal].
81. Nicholas Niggli, Chairman, Comm. On Gov't Procurement, The GPA
Renegotiation: Time to Close the Deal (Oct 18, 2011), available at www.wto.org/english/
news-e/newsl e/gpa stat_18oct11 e.doc.
82. Pruzin - Procurement Deal, supra note 80.
83. Id.
84. Daniel Pruzin, GPA Talks Chair Cites Growing Confidence in WTO Procurement
Deal in December, 28 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1689 (Oct. 20, 2011) [hereinafter Pruzin -
GPA]. The U.S. states that have not permitted any of their procurement to be covered are
Alabama, Alaska, Georgia, Indiana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, Virginia and West Virginia.
85. Id.
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the Uruguay Round,86 and the United States successfully insisted that
the revised GPA be concluded by December 2011, rejecting in October
the idea of no more than an agreement in principle by that date.87
2. Revisions to the Information Technology Agreement
The original ITA was not a part of the Uruguay Round package.
Rather, it was concluded as a plurilateral agreement at the WTO's
Singapore Ministerial Conference in December 1996.88 The original
number of participants (twenty-nine) has grown to seventy,
representing some 97 percent of world trade in IT products.89 (Brazil
appears to be the only major member that has not become a party.) The
ITA provides for complete elimination of tariffs on IT products, with
some developed country members afforded extended grace periods for
certain products. 90 Since 2010, the WTO's ITA Committee had been
discussing a proposal by the EU for a broad review of the ITA, which
would include negotiations on non-tariff barriers and expand both
product coverage and membership. 91 (The tariff reductions apply under
the MFN principle to all WTO members, whether or not they are party
to the ITA). Because of GATT's MFN clause the tariff reductions under
the ITA apply to all WTO Members. 92
3. Other Plurilateral Agreements Applicable to Trade in Goods
Former United States Trade Representative Schwab has suggested
that the ITA approach might also be applied in a plurilateral agreement
that would cover pharmaceuticals, medical equipment, and/or health
care services, with the objective to reduce the costs associated with
delivering health care. 93 In some areas, such as pharmaceuticals, the
major producers include both developed nations, such as the United
States and the EU, and developed Members, such as India, Brazil, and
86. Daniel Pruzin, GPA Chairman Warns of Setback in Government Procurement
Talks, 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1923 (Dec. 1, 2011).
87. U.S. Says Revised GPA Must be Fully Concluded by December Ministerial, 29
INSIDE U.S. TRADE no. 41, INSIDE U.S. TRADE'S Oct. 21, 2011.
88. Information Technology Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop e/inftec e/itaintro e.htm.
89. Pascal Lamy, Director-General, WTO, Opening Remarks at the WTO Information
Technology Symposium (Mar. 28, 2007), available at http://www.wto.org/english/
news-e/sppl-e/sppl58_e.htm.
90. Information Technology Agreement, supra note 88.
91. EU Pushes for Review of Information Technology Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORG.
(Nov. 11, 2010), http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/news10_e/ita_11nov10_e.htm.
92. Information Technology Agreement, supra note 88.
93. Schwab, supra note 17, at 116.
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Thailand. 94 Whether those interested would be willing to conclude such
agreement or agreements knowing that most of the benefits would
accrue to free riders remains to be seen.
4. Electronic Commerce
The WTO "Work Programme on Electronic Commerce" made little
progress as reflected by a cryptic statement in 2001.
As part of the Work Programme, the General Council has engaged
in substantive discussions based on the reports submitted to it by the
subsidiary Councils and Committees as well as on other relevant
considerations. Given the rapid evolution of electronic commerce, many
Members attach importance to further focused deliberations on a
number of the issues raised.95
This is an area in which the WTO has already had considerable
success in reaching a "standstill" understanding not to impose customs
duties on electronic commerce; the longstanding policy has been rolled
over at least until October 2012,96 with further extensions likely.
The issues were addressed more fully in some regional trade
agreements, including many of those concluded by the United States in
recent years. For example, the United States-Korea Free Trade
Agreement provides inter alia that the parties will not "impose customs
duties, fees, or other charges on or in connection with the importation
or exportation of . .. a digital product fixed on a carrier medium; or a
digital product transmitted electronically."9 7 Other members would
likely consider similar commitments on a reciprocal basis.
5. Investment and Anti-Competition Law
Both investment and competition law as they relate to trade were
included in the Doha Declaration,98 but strong support for negotiations
94. IMAP, PHARMACEUTICALS & BIOTECH INDUSTRY GLOBAL REPORT 5 (2011),
available at http://www.slideshare.net/Zash/pharmaceuticals-and-biotech-industry-global-
report-2011.
95. World Trade Organization, Introduction of the Report of the General Council:
Statement by Mr. Stuart Harbison, Chairman of the General Council, WT/MIN(01)/14
(Nov. 9, 2011), available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/ministe/minOl
e/wtmin01_14 e.pdf.
96. Continued Doha Disagreements Raise Doubts About Ministerial Declaration, 29
INSIDE U.S. TRADE no. 40, Oct. 13, 2011.
97. Free Trade Agreement between the United States and the Republic of Korea,
U.S.-S. Korea, art. 15.3, June 30, 2007, http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/ files/uploads
/agreements/fta/korus/asset-upload file816_12714.pdf (not yet entered into force).
98. Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 37, paras. 20-22 (investment), 23-25
(competition).
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on these two issues has been limited to the EU and Japan. The topics
were dropped from the Doha negotiating agenda in 2004.99
Efforts over more than fifty years, beginning with the Havana
Charter, to conclude broadly based international agreements on
investment and competition law have been notoriously unsuccessful
even among developed nations despite the proliferation of bilateral
investment treaties (BITs),100 and new efforts are no more promising
except perhaps in the long term. The most recent "multilateral
agreement on investment" (MAI), undertaken by the then twenty-five
members of the Organization for Cooperation and Development (OECD)
and the European Commission, would have been open to all interested
nations.101 That effort collapsed in 1998 due to concerns in several
developed nations, particularly France, that the accord would give
foreign investors excessive power to challenge as indirect expropriation
governmental actions protecting the environment and human health,
and undermine state authority for these and other exercises of police
power without incurring liability. 102
Efforts to conclude broad multilateral accords on standards for
anti-competition law have been even less successful. Plans to improve
international cooperation on anti-competition issues began with the
Havana Charter, but the Charter was rejected by the Congress in part
because of the anti-trust provisions.103 Subsequently, no international
agreement has been concluded that "requires cooperation by states in
the identification or prosecution of conduct that violates competition
99. The Doha Declaration Explained: Relationship between Trade and Investment,
Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ddae/dohaexplained-e.htm#investment (last visited
Jan. 23, 2012).
100. More than 2760 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and 250 free trade
agreements (FTAs) with investment chapters had been concluded, with more than 2000 in
force. U.N. CONE. ON TRADE & DEV., PREVENTION AND ALTERNATIVES TO ARBITRATION II,
at xvii, available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia20lO8_en.pdf; see also
Americo Beviglia Zampetti & Pierre Sauv4, International Investment, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 211, 215 (Andrew T. Guzman & Alan 0.
Sykes eds., Edward Elgar 2007) (citing 2005 data).
101. Multilateral Agreement on Investment, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV.,
http://www.oecd.org/document/35/0,3343,en_2649_33783766_1894819_1_1_1,00.html
[hereinafter OECD-MAI].
102. See Peter T. Muchlinski, The Rise and Fall of the Multilateral Agreement on
Investment: Where Now?, 34 INT'L LAW. 1033, 145-48 (2000); see also Riyaz Dattu, A
Journey from Havana to Paris: the Fifty-Year Quest for the Elusive Multilateral
Agreement on Investment, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 275 (2000) (discussing the MAI and
several alternatives). The OECD website simply states tersely that "Negotiations were
discontinued in April 1998 . and they will not be resumed." OECD-MAI, supra note
101.
103. Andrew T. Guzman, International Competition Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK IN
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 418, 424 (Andrew T. Guzman & Alan 0. Sykes eds.,
Edward Elgar 2007).
338 VOL. 40:1-3
WORLD TRADE LAW AFTER DOHA
laws."104 United States bilateral competition agreements with the EU
and several of the individual members - Australia, Canada, Brazil,
Israel, Japan, and Mexico - are mostly limited to notification and
information sharing.10 5 Occasional, more extensive anti-competition
provisions appear to be limited to certain RTAs, such as the United
States-Singapore FTA competition chapter.1 06
Perhaps a notification and information-sharing agreement along
the lines of those noted above could be concluded with a larger group of
countries, but whether it would improve antitrust enforcement
significantly world-wide is less clear. Longstanding differences in
approach, including the private treble damage actions and injunctions
that are features of United States law 07 and the efforts the United
States makes to apply its anti-trust laws on an extraterritorial basis,10 8
along with differing approaches to mergers and acquisitions between
the United States Department of Justice and the European
Commissionl 09 suggest that any meaningful accord is likely a long way
away.
6. Services
While it is at least conceivable that some sort of services disciplines
could be available to a significant group as a plurilateral agreement,
MFN considerations among others make this difficult.110 While waivers
of MFN requirements are at least theoretically possible under GATS,111
the likelihood of a waiver for the multiple parties to a plurilateral
104. Id. at 425.
105. Id.
106. United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, U.S-Sing., art. 12.2.1, May 6,
2003, http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/ftalsingapore/asset-up
load_file708_4036.pdf [hereinafter Singapore FTA]. It requires inter alia that "Each
Party shall adopt or maintain measures to proscribe anticompetitive business conduct
with the objective of promoting economic efficiency and consumer welfare, and shall take
appropriate action with respect to such conduct."
107. 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (2011).
108. See, e.g., AARON XAVIER FELLMUTH, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS 530-34 (West 2009) (discussing the jurisdictional reach of the U.S.
antitrust laws); Guzmann & Sykes, supra note 100, at 419-22.
109. Guzman & Sykes, supra note 100, at 423.
110. At the eighth Ministerial Meeting in Geneva in December 2011, the Ministers
agreed to a waiver of non-discriminatory treatment so that preferential treatment in
services could be offered by developed and developing countries to least developed
countries. WTO ministers adopt waiver to permit preferential treatment of LDC service
suppliers, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Dec. 17, 2011), http://www.wto.orglenglish/news_e/
news1l1e/serv17dec11 e.htm.
111. Waivers for individual members are contemplated under GATS Article II.2 and
Annex on Article II Exemptions, but they apply primarily upon accession to GATS. See
General Agreement on Trade in Services art. 11.2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 33 I.L.M. 1167, 1869 U.N.T.S 183
[hereinafter GATS].
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services agreement that does not meet the requirements of GATS
Article V "economic integration agreements" seems slight. Rather, it
would seem much more practical to focus on expanding services
disciplines through a regional trade agreement or "economic integration
agreement" (EIA) as authorized under GATS, as discussed in Part IV,
below.
IV. CONTINUED PROLIFERATION OF RTAs
The authority of GATT/WTO members to enter into customs unions
and free trade agreements dates from the original GATT 1947, Article
XXIV. 112 The compromise between the MFN principle and the
perceived need for an exception for regional trade agreements was
designed to deal primarily with the then-existing relationships between
the United Kingdom and the members of the commonwealth (former
colonies).113 The United States was concerned that without some
limitations they would adversely affect United States interests. 1 14 As a
result, Article XXIV was crafted to limit, at least in theory, customs
unions and FTAs to situations in which the agreement covered
"substantially all [ ] trade," achieved their objectives of eliminating
tariffs and most tariff barriers "within a reasonable length of time"
(usually ten years), and did not result in increasing tariffs on imports
from non-members of the customs union or RTA.115 Article XXIV also
incorporated explicit notification and monitoring requirements,
modified on several occasions over the years. 116 Unfortunately, the
Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) and its predecessors
were largely ineffective in assuring that the RTAs actually complied
with the requirements.117 Efforts to further improve the review system
as part of the Doha Round evidenced little progress in a decade.118 In
112. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XXIV, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, at
A66, 55 U.N.T.S 187, at 268 [hereinafter GATT], available at http://www.wto.org/
english/docs-e/legal e/gatt47_e.pdf.
113. See JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF THE GATT 576-77 (Bobbs-
Merrill 1969).
114. Id.
115. GATT, supra note 112, arts. XXIV(8), XXIV(5).
116. GATT, supra note 112, art. XXIV(6); Uruguay Round Understanding on the
Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A,
33 I.L.M. 1125, 1161-1163; General Counsel, Transparency Mechanism for Regional
Trade Agreements, WT/L/671 (Dec. 14, 2006).
117. For example, despite the requirement of review of each RTA by the CRTA, "no
examination report has been finalized since 1995 because of lack of consensus." Work of
the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA), WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/region-e/regcom-e.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2012).
118. Negotiating Group on Rules Chair Ambassador Dennis Francis, on 17 March
2011, "noted the limited progress so far in negotiations on regional trade agreements . . ."
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fairness, the number of RTAs submitted for review has overwhelmed
the review system, and the inability of the Members to agree on such
critical definitions as the meaning of "substantially all trade" has made
a difficult task virtually impossible.
What Professor Jagwash Bhagwati calls the "spaghetti bowl" effect
of proliferation and expansion of RTAs"a has nevertheless been a
relatively recent phenomenon, with the majority negotiated since the
early 1990s. 12 0 As of January 2012, more than 511 customs unions, free
trade areas, and less restricted trade agreements permissible for
developing countries under the 1979 "Enabling Clause" 121 had been
notified to the WTO Secretariat, with another 105 notified under Article
V of the General Agreement on Trade in Services.12 2
This "modern" era of RTAs originated in part as a result of a major
change in United States policy toward RTAs beginning in the early to
mid-1980s. 123 The Single Market Initiative adopted in the EU in 1987
had a significant demonstration effect elsewhere in the world, as with
MERCOSUR and the ASEAN FTA.124 The United States, although a
long-term supporter of European integration, grasped the importance of
Europe's enhanced access to relatively low-wage production with the
accession of Ireland (1973), Greece (1979), and Spain and Portugal
(1986)125 and the implications for Europe's competitiveness with the
Western Hemisphere and with Asia. 12 6
The United States was also frustrated from 1982-1985 in its efforts
to bring about a new GATT negotiating round because of indifference
from the internally preoccupied Europeans. United States Trade
Representative William Brock and his colleague in the United States
Government decided to respond to this rebuff by championing FTAs
Regional Trade Agreements, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Mar. 17, 2011) http://www.wto.org
/english/news e/newslle/rta_17mar11_e.htm.
119. See Jagdish Bhagwati & Arvind Panagariya, Preferential Trading Areas and
Multilateralism - Strangers, Friends, or Foes?, in THE ECONOMICS OF PREFERENTIAL
TRADE AGREEMENTS 1, 53 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Arvind Panagariya eds., AEI Press 1996)
[hereinafter Bhagwati & Panagariya - PTAs].
120. Regional Trade Agreements, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop-e/region-e/regione.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2012) [hereinafter WTO - RTAs].
121. Differential and More Favourable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller Participation
of Developing Countries, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Nov. 28, 1979), http://www.wto.org/english/
docs ellegal e/enablingl979_e.htm.
122. WTO-RTAs, supra note 120.
123. JEFFREY A. FRANKEL, REGIONAL TRADING BLOCS IN THE WORLD ECONOMIC
SYSTEM 4-5 (Inst. for Int'l Econ. 1997).
124. Id.
125. PAOLO MENGOZZI, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW: FROM THE TREATY OF ROME TO
THE TREATY OF AMSTERDAM 3 (Kluwer L. Int'l 2nd ed. 1992); WILLIAM A. LOVETT, ALFRED
E. ECKES, JR. & RICHARD L. BRINKMAN, U.S. TRADE POLICY: HISTORY, THEORY AND THE
WTO 83 (M.E. Sharpe 1999).
126. See LOVETT, ET AL., supra note 125, at 83.
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with Israel and then Canada. The logic then, as today with the WTO's
Doha Round, was that if the preferred global freer trade initiatives
could not move forward, regional trade arrangements could provide a
viable alternative. 127
An enormous volume of literature debates on the pros and cons of
regional trade agreements. 12 8 Bhagwati and some other economists
have decried the expanding numbers of RTAs, terming them (with some
logic) "preferential trade agreements" instead.129 The WTO Secretariat
offers a more nuanced view (perhaps keeping in mind that only
Mongolia among the WTO members is not party to a single RTA):
They [the WTO and RTAs] seem to be contradictory, but often
regional trade agreements can actually support the WTO's
multilateral trading system. Regional agreements have allowed
groups of countries to negotiate rules and commitments that go
beyond what was possible at the time multilaterally. In turn,
some of these rules have paved the way for agreement in the
WTO. Services, intellectual property, environmental standards,
investment and competition policies are all issues that were
raised in regional negotiations and later developed into
agreements or topics of discussion in the WTO. The groupings
that are important for the WTO are those that abolish or reduce
barriers on trade within the group. The WTO agreements
recognize that regional arrangements and closer economic
integration can benefit countries. It also recognizes that under
some circumstances regional trading arrangements could hurt
the trade interests of other countries . . . In particular, the
arrangements should help trade flow more freely among the
countries in the group without barriers being raised on trade
with the outside world. In other words, regional integration
should complement the multilateral trading system and not
threaten it. 130
127. DAVID A. GANTZ, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 14-15 (Carolina Academic Press
2009) [hereinafter Gantz-RTAs].
128. See generally, JAGDISH BHAGWATI, FREE TRADE TODAY (Princeton Univ. Press
2002); ECONOMICS OF PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS (Jagdish Bhagwati & Arvind
Panagariya eds., Am. Enter. Inst. 1996); BERNARD M. HOEKMAN & MICHAEL M. KOSTECKI,
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: THE WTO AND BEYOND
(Oxford Univ. Press 2nd ed. 2001); RICHARD POMFRET, THE ECONOMICS OF REGIONAL
TRADING ARRANGEMENTS (Clarendon Press 1997); Frankel, supra note 123; Gantz-RTAs,
supra note 127, ch. 2.
129. Bhagwati & Panagariya-PTAs, supra note 119, at 4.
130. Regionalism: Friends or Rivals?, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/
english/thewto e/whatis e/tif e/beyl-e.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2011).
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One factor noted earlier is concern among many WTO members
about increasing imports from China. RTAs provide an obvious solution
to this problem; a member can reduce or eliminate tariffs among
members of and RTA without offering such reduced tariffs to China on
an MFN basis, 131 and likely can find many reasons other than fear of
China to justify a new RTA.
What will happen with RTAs if there is an extended period when
no major negotiations are taking place at the WTO? It seems likely
that there will be two major types of activity, the expansion and
deepening of existing RTAs and the negotiation and conclusion of new
ones, the former driven by the realization that any further expansion of
world trade in the short and medium term will likely be driven by
RTAs. Also, given the lack of interest by many WTO members in
further services marketing opening it seems likely that services RTAs
- perhaps stand-alone, without accompanying market opening in trade
in goods - may interest those members who wish to expand services
trade.
A. Widening and Deepening of Existing RTAs
With the end of the Doha Round as we know it and no prospect of
another comprehensive round in the foreseeable future the members of
some RTAs will see the expansion and improvement of existing
agreements to be of a higher priority that in the past, even though
changes may have been considered desirable before. In this subsection,
I look briefly at four RTAs - the EU, MERCOSUJR, the ASEAN FTA,
and NAFTA - and postulate that three of the four, which have in fact
been subject to modification periodically over their existence to date,
will be expanded again. Still, one cautions that with RTAs, as with the
WTO, the political will to take apparently desirable, sometimes
necessary steps may be lacking with or without the impetus of deadlock
at the WTO, as the history of all four agreements demonstrates.
While this subsection focuses on only a handful of RTAs, many
other countries are actively engaging in RTA negotiations and may be
expected to continue to do so. For example, as of January 2012,
eighteen WTO members have ten or more RTAs in force.132
131. Gantz-RTAs , supra note 127, at 18.
132. List of RTAs in Force by Country/Territory, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://rtais.wto.orgrUI/publicPreDefRepByCountry.aspx (last visited Jan. 25, 2011). This
group includes the EU (as a group), Chile, China, Iceland, India, Japan, Korea, Malaysia,
Mexico, Norway, Peru, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey,
the Ukraine, and the United States.
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1. European Union
After more than fifty-five years, and despite the Eurozone crisis,
the EU remains the world's most successful customs union, having
expanded from the original six members (France, Germany, Italy,
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg) to twenty-seven by 2007.
133 Tariffs and non-tariff barriers have long been eliminated; most
border controls no longer exist; EU legislation ("regulations" and
"directives") dominates in such areas as international trade regulation,
intellectual property, competition law, and environmental law; and with
some exceptions the EU has achieved free movement of labor and
capital as well as goods and services. 13 4 With the approval of the Treaty
of Lisbon in 2009, at least the seventh major treaty since founding, the
Commission and European Parliament's authority continued to
increase, encompassing, inter alia, foreign investment by the members
in third countries and the equivalent of a foreign minister.135 A true
political union nevertheless remains some years away. Much of the
success of the EU is based on the ability of the members to muster, at
least on some occasions, the political will to engage in a process of
deepening regional integration, albeit not always on linear basis and
not always with the full support of national populations.136
Consequently, the EU, at least until recently, was considered by other
aspirants as a model for other customs unions such as ASEAN and
MERCOSUR. 137
As of early 2012 the EU faces its most serious crisis ever with
Greece unable to pay its debts and questions arising whether Italy,
Portugal, and Spain can remain solvent in light of historically high
133. European Union: Basic Information, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., http://www.
ers.usda.gov/briefing/EuropeanUnion/basicinfo.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2012); See
generally, Jacob Funk Kirkegaard, The Euro Area Crisis: Origin, Current Status and
European and US Responses, Testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Europe and Asia (Oct. 27, 2011), available at
http://www.piie.com/publications/testimony/kirkegaard20111027.pdf.
134. SHEILA PAGE, REGIONALISM AMONG DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 97 (Overseas Dev.
Inst. 2000); See Gantz-RTAs, supra note 127, 319-34.
135. EU Treaties, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eulirelandlabout-the_
eu/treaties/indexen.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2012); See Trade Topics: Investment,
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eultrade/creating-opportunities/trade-topics/i
nvestment/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2012).
136. See generally, CATHERINE BARNARD, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EU (Oxford
Univ. Press 2d ed. 2007); Henrik Bull, The Constitutional Development of the European
Union, 83 N.D. L. REV. 1, 16 (2007); Elizabeth F. Defeis, A Constitution for the European
Union? A Transatlantic Perspective, 19 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 351 (2005); Thomas
Eilmansberger, IP and Antitrust in the European Union, 13 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 261,
263 (2007); T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW (Oxford 6th
ed. 2007).
137. FRANKEL, supra note 123, at 4-5.
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interest rates for the sale of government bonds. 38  The Eurozone,
created in 2001 with great fanfare and now encompassing seventeen of
the EU members (with ten, including the United Kingdom, remaining
outside), has chronically suffered from poor fiscal discipline and a
European Central Bank that lacks the necessary powers to step in and
serve beleaguered governments as a lender of last resort, thus providing
them with the liquidity they require to recover from the crisis 139 (for
example, with a Eurobond backed by all members of the Eurozone,
including Germany).
If the EU and the Eurozone survive in their present forms, it seems
almost certain that the treaties will again be supplemented,
presumably with the tougher rules to restrict government spending
deficits and greater European Central Bank and/or community legal
powers to monitor members' national financial policies.140 The
challenges of globalization and financial stability, particularly with the
dual system, may not be sustainable under such circumstances and
could lead to a "downward spiral."141 It is unclear at this writing
whether most of the twenty-seven members - or perhaps the seventeen
Eurozone members - will be able to agree on broad reforms of the EU
accords (a process that could take several years or more to complete) or
will need to restructure the Union to take into account a reduced or
post-Eurozone reality.
The December 2011 plan is for a treaty (technically outside the EU
process) providing for tighter regional oversight of government
spending to be concluded by the seventeen Eurozone members and
many if most of the other ten, with only the United Kingdom
demurring; however, the plan does not effectively address the high
interest rates that threaten the financial viability of Greece, Italy,
Spain, and perhaps other members.142 Inevitably, and regardless of the
survival of the Euro, many further changes in the EU agreements are
almost certain to occur in the coming years.143 These changes like
many others in the history of the EU are taking place largely
independently of developments in Geneva, but the longer the current
138. Eurozone Crisis: A Treasurer's Survival Guide, TREASURY TODAY (DEC. 1, 2011),
http://treasurytoday.com/handbook/eurozone-crisis-a-treasurers-survival-guide#what-will-
the-future-hold-for-the-eurozone.
139. Irene Chapple, How the Euro Became a Broken Dream, CNN.COM (Nov. 4, 2011,
1:26 AM), http://edition.cnn.com/2011/09/23fbusiness/europe-euro-creation-maastricht-
chapple/index.html.
140. See Wake up, Euro Zone, ECONOMIST, Oct. 22, 2011, at 65.
141. Europe and Its Currency: Staring into the Abyss, ECONOMIST, Nov. 12, 2011, at 3-
4.
142. Summit for One, ECONOMIST, Jan. 7, 2012, available at http://www.economist.
com/node/21542450.
143. Steven Erlanger & Stephen Castle, German Vision Prevails as European Leaders
Agree on Fiscal Treaty, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2011, at Al.
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crisis continues the less attention the EU nations are likely to pay to
improving the global trading system.
Eventually, additional countries will likely be brought in to the EU,
and perhaps ultimately even to the Eurozone. Croatia is scheduled to
enter the EU in July 2012; Montenegro and perhaps Bosnia, Kosovo,
Macedonia, and Serbia are likely to ultimately meet the criteria for EU
admission more quickly as a result of the lack of action in Geneva and
the understanding that complying with the EU entrance requirements
means a level of modernization of national laws that probably cannot be
achieved any other way. 144 The present membership, in contrast, is
sufficiently preoccupied with the Eurozone crisis and slow economic
growth generally that they may resist further accessions for years. The
current levels of economic and political integration may be increased
again despite popular resistance, but probably not in the short or
medium term.
2. MERCOSUR145
MERCOSUR (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay)
represents one of the most ambitious and important regional trade
agreements ever concluded. In the aggregate, MERCOSUR nations
have more than 230 million inhabitants and a gross domestic product of
more than $1.25 trillion. 146 MERCOSUR continues to hold promise in
the longer term - whatever that is - for trade liberalization among
the four Member States and within South America,147 although as of
January 2012 the members are becoming more rather than less
protectionist. 148 The group benefits from common borders, a history of
intra-regional trade, and relative lack of competition among the
144. See The Balkans and Europe: The Pull of Brussels, EcONOMIST, Oct. 15, 2011, at
60 (discussing the various candidates and their prospects for meeting the criteria for
admission); Suzanne Daley & Stephen Castle, As European Union Beckons, Allure Fades
for Weary Croatia, N.Y. TIMES (Electronic Ed.), Jan. 17, 2012.
145. This subsection is based on Gantz-RTAs, supra note 127, at 365-66; see also
RAFAEL A. PORRATA-DORIA, JR., MERCOSUR: THE COMMON MARKET OF THE SOUTHERN
CONE (Carolina Academic Press, 2005); Thomas Andrew O'Keefe, Economic Integration as
a Means for Promoting Regional Political Stability: Lessons from the European Union
and MERCOSUR, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 187 (2005); John AE Vervaele, Mercosur and
Regional Integration in South America, 54 I.C.L.Q. 387 (2005).
146. EU, Mercosur Trade, available at http://trade.ec.europa.euldoclib/docs/2006/
september/tradoc1 13488.pdf (last visited Apr. 27, 2008) (2006 data converted to dollars).
147. Comprehensive sources for analysis of MERCOSUJR include RAFAEL A. PORRATA-
DORIA, JR., MERCOSUR: THE COMMON MARKET OF THE SOUTHERN CONE (Carolina
Academic Press, 2005); THOMAS ANDREW O'KEEFE, Common Market of the South, LATIN
AMERICAN TRADE AGREEMENTS chs. 408 (Martinius Nijhoff Publ. 2007); and John AE
Vervaele, Mercosur and Regional Integration in South America, 54 I.C.L.Q. 387 (2005);
Inter-American Development Bank, MERCOSUR Report, 2009-10, Mar. 2011.
148. Haskel, Mercosur Plans to Raise Import Duties to Counter Avalanche of Predatory
Export,' supra note 46.
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constituent economies. 149 On paper, MERCOSUR seeks to include the
common market characteristics of labor and capital mobility and
coordination of economic policies. For Brazil, by far the most
economically powerful member, MERCOSUR has political significance,
offering the promise of a closely linked group of economic allies to assist
a world power in offsetting the dominance of the United States in the
Western Hemisphere.1 50
Unfortunately, as is often the case with RTAs, the implementation
of the MERCOSUR agreements lags well behind the formal legal and
institutional framework. The early years, 1992-1999, embodied a
general commitment to gradual economic integration and considerable
progress in eliminating intra-regional customs duties for originating
products, some reduction in non-tariff barriers, and increased coverage
of the common external tariff (CET).151 Since then, MERCOSUR has
fallen behind in timetables and expectations. Institution-building has
languished.15 2 Little progress has been made in establishing the free
movement of persons, services and capital. 153 The development of a
rules-based system with strong institutions and viable dispute
settlement has been an aspiration rather than a reality despite
improvements in the dispute settlement system in recent years, and
both Argentina and Brazil are going their separate ways when dealing
with increasing imports from China. 154 It remains to be seen whether
the members of MERCOSUR will make renewed efforts toward
improving the functioning common market as a result of the demise of
Doha, and ultimately bring about the accession of Venezuela, 15 5 or if the
group will continue to reflect a lack of progress and frequent back-
sliding, thus failing to meet its long-stated goals and objectives.
149. Samuel A. Arieti, The Role of MERCOSUR as a Vehicle for Latin American
Integration, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 761, 764 (2006).
150. See Mario E. Carranza, MERCOSUR, the Free Trade Area of the Americas, and
the Future of U.S. Hegemony in Latin America, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1029, 1063-64
(2004) (asserting that "the Southern Cone countries are now makers and not simply
takers of international policy, having decided to take their destiny into their own hands").
151. See Jorge M. Guira, MERCOSUR as an Instrument for Development, 3 NAFTA: L.
& Bus. REV. AM. 53, 53-57 (1997).
152. See Arieti, supra note 149, at 764 (discussing some of the causes, including
reluctance to cede political sovereignty).
153. See John AE Vervaele, Mercosur and Regional Integration in South America, 54
I.C.L.Q. 387, 408 (2005) (discussing the lack of progress in these areas as well as with
recognition by the Parties of general principles of MERCOSUR law).
154. See Ed Taylor, Brazil Increases Excise Tax on Car Imports, Exempts Those With
65% Domestic Content, 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1546 (2011) (reporting on measures
taken by Brazil alone to protect domestic manufacturers against Chinese auto imports);
Protectionism in Argentina: Keep Out, ECONOMIST, Sep. 24, 2011, at 47 (reporting on the
use of "non-automatic licensing" and other measures to slow imports).
155. See David Haskel, Venezuela's Admission, Free Trade Talks with EU, Top
Mercosur Leader's Agenda, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA), Dec. 14, 2011.
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3. ASEANFTA156
ASEAN as now constituted includes a population of around 500
million persons, land area of 4.5 million square kilometers, total trade
of $850 billion (internal and external), and GDP of about $700 billion.157
The group encompasses several of the most dynamic trading nations of
the world (Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and Vietnam) as
well as several of the least open (Laos, Myanmar), along with Brunei,
Cambodia, and Indonesia.158  The wide differences in levels of
development and receptiveness to foreign investment and open markets
among other factors have led to a "least common denominator" effect in
which accords among the now ten members inevitably represent
significant compromise by the bolder, more open member governments.
Moreover, ASEAN Members have historically faced political and
security challenges which discouraged and delayed greater economic
integration, such as border clashes between Thailand and Cambodia. 159
ASEAN also suffers from poor infrastructure, including but not limited
to lengthy land travel routes that are served by poor road and railroad
networks. 160
ASEAN and AFTA consist legally of literally dozens of agreements
and declarations, often overlapping and/or in conflict, sometimes un-
ratified after many years. 161 The reluctance on the part of some of the
member governments to make firm commitments and to adopt
functioning and binding legal rules and structures includes a lack of
156. This subsection draws on Gantz-RTAs, supra note 127, at 411-12, 432-33. Major
sources for information on ASEAN include ZAKIR HAFEZ, THE DIMENSIONS OF REGIONAL
TRADE INTEGRATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (Transnational, 2004); Lay Hong Tan, Will
ASEAN Economic Integration Progress Beyond a Free Trade Area?, 53 I.C.L.Q. 935 (2004);
Paul. J. Davidson, The ASEAN Way and the Role of Law in ASEAN Economic
Cooperation, 8 S.Y.B.I.L. 165 (2004).
157. TEO Chee Hai, Mutual Recognition of Surveying Qualifications Within the
ASEAN, Framework Agreement on Services, INT'L FEDERATION OF SURVEYORS,
http://www.fig.net/pub/jakartalpapers/ps-05/ps_05_3_teo.pdf.
158. Member Countries, ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS, http://www.
asean.org/74.htm.
159. See, e.g., Neil Chatterjee, ASEAN Summit Fails to Resolve Thai-Cambodia
Conflict, REUTERS, May 8, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/08
/us-asean-idUSTRE74709V20110508 (reporting on ongoing border skirmishes).
160. Even in 2002, one of the key areas of China-ASEAN cooperation was acceleration
of various multinational rail and highway projects, as well as development of the Mekong
River basin. See Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-Operation
Between ASEAN and the People's Republic of China Preamble, Nov. 5, 2002, available at
http://www.aseansec.org/13197.htm [hereinafter ACFTA Framework Agreement].
161. See ASEAN Secretariat, Table of Treaties/Agreements and Ratifications, ASEAN
(last updated May 2011), http://www.aseansec.org/Ratification.pdf (listing 205
instruments that not including dozens of ministerial and other declarations). This table
is probably the best available source of the status of ratification of the various ASEAN
and AFTA agreements.
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apparent support for effective dispute resolution. "Framework"
agreements are particularly popular, likely because they allow the
members to announce their intention to conclude arrangements while
accession to more significant and binding obligations is deferred.16 2 The
cautious approach persisted despite China's soaking up the lion's share
of the region's direct foreign investment, continuing credibility
problems with foreign traders and investors over vague and non-
transparent rules that really are not legally binding and in any event
cannot be enforced, and evidence that the market-based approach
increasingly in use elsewhere works better than ASEAN's heavy
reliance on government regulation. 163
Perhaps inevitably, the policies of Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia,
Indonesia, and recently Vietnam have emphasized investment in
export-intensive industries and greater integration with global
economies rather than restricted markets and import-substitution
either individually or as part of ASEAN. 164 Many ASEAN Members
have greater interest and see more economic benefit in fostering
expanded trade relations with nations outside Southeast Asia than with
the other members of ASEAN,1 65 although after nearly a decade of
negotiations a free trade agreement between China and the ASEAN
nations went into effect January 1, 2010.166 Still, improvements in the
dispute settlement system (on paper at least) and the ratification of the
Bali Concord II by all ten members within a year may be reason for
very cautious optimism. Will the challenges of competition from China
and from members who are concluding FTAs and bilateral investment
treaties with third countries, augmented by a lack of trade
liberalization in Geneva, encourage the members of ASEAN to move
forward with their regional integration? Or will ASEAN continue to
162. See Agreement on Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the Framework Agreement
on Comprehensive Economic Co-Operation Between the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations and the People's Republic of China, Preamble, Jan. 1, 2005, available at
http://www.asean.org/16635.htm.
163. See Hal Hill & Jayant Menon, ASEAN Economic Integration: Features,
Fulfillments, Failures and the Future 5-6 (Asian Dev. Bank, Working Paper No. 69, 2010).
164. See Lay Hong Tan, Will ASEAN Economic Integration Progress Beyond a Free
Trade Area?, 53 I.C.L.Q. 935, 938 (2004) (discussing early efforts at greater regional
economic cooperation among ASEAN governments to encourage intra-regional trade and
investment).
165. For example, in a book on the EU and ASEAN, the authors effectively suggested
that EU nations might prefer to deal with individual ASEAN nations such as Malaysia
and Singapore rather than as a group. See MARY T. YEUNG, NICHOLAS PERDIKIS &
WILLIAM A. KERR, REGIONAL TRADING BLOCS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: THE EU AND
ASEAN 134-35 (Edward Elgar, 1999).
166. The China-ASEAN Free-Trade Agreement - Ajar for Business; More Breadth
than Depth, ECONOMIST, Jan. 7, 2010, available at http://www.economist.com/
node/15211682.
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muddle along without contributing to market opening either among the
members or with other nations?
4. North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 16 7 (United
States, Canada, and Mexico) is the world's largest free trade area,
accounting for over $1 trillion worth of trilateral trade in goods and
services in a region of over 450 million persons with $17 trillion in GDP,
more than any other regional trading bloc except the European
Union. 168 NAFTA provides for elimination of all intra-regional tariffs
and removal of essentially all non-tariff barriers except for those
applicable a few agricultural products. 169 It also incorporates
comprehensive rules for, inter alia, treatment of foreign investment
(including investor-state dispute settlement); government procurement;
trade in services, including financial and transportation services;
customs procedures; technical standards; sanitary and phytosanitary
standards; protection of intellectual property; trade in agriculture,
energy, and basic petrochemicals; temporary immigration entry for
business purposes; appeals of administrative decision; appeals in
antidumping and countervailing duty trade actions; and comprehensive
dispute settlement regarding disagreements among the governments
concerning the application or interpretation of NAFTA provisions and
administrative determinations in unfair trade (dumping, subsidies)
cases. 170
NAFTA differs in two major ways from the EU, MERCOSUR, and
the ASEAN FTA: a) it is an FTA rather than a customs union, with the
three Parties remaining free to set their own MFN tariffs under WTO
rules; and b) with minor exceptions, NAFTA is a single instrument, one
that has not been amended in eighteen years. 171 It is effectively a
167. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S. - Can. - Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter "NAFTA"].
168. Office of the United States Trade Representative, North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (last visited Oct. 24, 2011),
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/north-american-free-trade-
agreement-nafta.
169. NAFTA, supra note 167, art. 309, Annex 302.2.
170. Useful sources include THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: A NEW
FRONTIER IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN THE AMERICAS (Judith H. Bello
et al., eds.) (ABA, 1994); THE FUTURE OF NORTH AMERICAN INTEGRATION: BEYOND
NAFTA (Peter Hakin & Robert E. Litan, eds., Brookings, 2002); GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER
& JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, NAFTA REVISITED: ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES (Inst. for Int'l
Economics, 2005).
171. Frederick M. Abbott, The North American Integration Regime and its
Implications for the World Trading System, in THE EU, THE WTO AND THE NAFTA,
TOWARDS A COMMON LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 169, 171 (Joseph H.H. Weiler, ed.
2000); NAFTA, supra note 167.
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"confederation among independent sovereigns, each maintaining
autonomous political decision-making authority within the constraints
defined by agreement." 172 Also, like the EU but unlike MERCOSUR
and ASEAN, NAFTA's internal trade liberalization measures have been
fully implemented in accordance with the schedules agreed upon during
the negotiations. 17 3 The built in mechanism for accelerating tariff
reductions and making rules of origin more flexible has been utilized
but not with regard to "sensitive" goods. United States law provides
authorization for the United States to agree with Canada and Mexico
on periodic modifications of the rules of origin to facilitate achievement
of freer trade, 7 4 and such authority is exercised on a regular basis. 175
Otherwise, major changes in NAFTA have been impossible to
achieve, even though after eighteen years it is obvious that revisions
are desirable (if not urgent) in areas including government procurement
(extending the chapter to state and local entities), rules of origin, and
achieving parity for Mexico with newer United States FTAs. Mexican
politicians beginning with President Vincente Fox in 2000 have
periodically called for a widening and deepening of NAFTA, moving
toward a common market with a common currency and free labor flows
that more closely reflects European integration.1 7 6 Then as now, such
expansion, requiring amendment of the agreement, is politically
unacceptable in the United States (and probably in Mexico today as
well) as President Obama's decision in 2009 to effectively abandon
campaign promises to amend NAFTA demonstrated. 7 7 Still, it is
possible that the United States and Canada may be more willing in the
future to consider such proposals in the absence of negotiations in
Geneva in the longer term, or to do a "backdoor" modernization of
NAFTA through participation by all three NAFTA Parties in the Trans-
Pacific Partnership.
172. Id.
173. NAFTA, supra note 167, art. 302, annex 302.2.
174. 19 U.S.C. § 3332(q) (1998).
175. See, e.g., Proclamation by the President to Modify Rules of Origin Under the North
American Free Trade Agreement, THE WHITE HOUSE (Oct. 11, 2006), http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/10/2006101 1-11.html.
176. See John M. Nagel, Fox's Calls for Expansion of NAFTA Held Unlikely to Gain
U.S. Approval, 17 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1085 (2000) (suggesting that Mexico requires a
7 percent annual growth rate to create the jobs necessary to keep Mexican workers from
migrating to the United States).
177. See Nacha Cattan & Rossella Brevetti, Mexico Sees Need to Dust Off, Rehabilitate
Aging NAFTA with U.S., Canada, 27 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 93 (2010) (discussing the
lack of pressure to renegotiate NAFTA in both the U.S. and Canada and some of the
changes that have been discussed).
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B. Conclusion of New or Pending RTAs
1. European Union Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs)178
While the EU at any given time is negotiating a number of RTAs,
including a potentially significant agreement with Canada in 2011179
and a proposed "WTO Plus" agreement with Russia, 180 this discussion
focuses on EU negotiations with former colonies - the Asian,
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states, which are most likely to be made
most urgent by the collapse of Doha. The EPAs arise out of a long-term
trade and development policy that pre-dates the European Union and
originates in the colonial era. France, the Netherlands, and the United
Kingdom in particular have sought to maintain close relationships with
their former colonies, although historical links have been replaced by
economic development needs as the most significant (although not only)
justification.181 It was and is a discriminatory policy in which former
colonies in general were afforded more favorable access to the EU
market than the rest of the developing world (including those in Latin
America who obtained their independence from Spain and Portugal
150-200 years ago). 182 The evolution of individual EU Member State
policies was subsumed into the EU beginning in the 1950s; the EC
Treaty includes among the list of EU activities "the association of
overseas countries and territories in order to increase trade and
promote jointly economic and social development." 183
Initial efforts to maintain special trade relations with former
colonies, the Yaound6 Conventions with new African states, were
generally reciprocal in nature. Nevertheless the EC Treaty provisions
(although not the Yaound6 Conventions per se) raised consistency
issues under GATT Article XXIV. According to the Working Party,
duties were not to be eliminated on substantially all trade, and there
were also objections to the limited (five year) term of the agreements.
Questions of law were shelved in favor of an informal agreement to
178. This subsection draws on Gantz-RTAs, supra note 127, at 346-49.
179. See Peter Menyasz, Free Trade Talks Between Canada, EU Enter Ninth Round of
Negotiations, Fast Says, 28 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1700 (2011) (reporting on what
Canadian authorities have called "our most significant trade initiative since the North
American Free Trade Agreement").
180. EU, Russia Moving Towards 'WTO Plus' Trade Agreement, Eventual FTA, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE'S WORLD TRADE ONLINE (Dec. 16, 2011), http://wtonewsstand.com/Inside-US-
Trade/Inside-U. S.-Trade- 12/16/201 1/menu-id-445.html.
181. Lorand Bartels, The Trade and Development Policy of the European Union, 18
EUR. J. INT'L L. 715, 717, 726, 756 (2007). The former Spanish and Portuguese colonies in
Latin America, most of which became independent around 1820, are treated differently.
182. See id., at 715-16.
183. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community art. 3(s), Mar. 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 3.
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GATT consultations should any future problems arise. 184 EU
maintenance of association or economic partnership agreements with
its former colonies, with the less advantageous GSP offered to other
developing countries, continues to complicate EU trade and
development policy to this day.
The Community's trade and development policies in the 1970s and
1980s were primarily non-reciprocal, both in the association agreements
and in implementation of GSP. Fortunately for the EU, legal
challenges under GATT did not occur for some years. 185 In 1975, the
EU concluded the first of what would be a thirty-five year series of still
non-reciprocal agreements with the ACP states, the four Lom6
conventions, and Cotonou Agreements.18 6  The trade cooperation
provisions of the Cotonou Agreement (providing duty-free treatment for
most ACP products entering the EU) were not GATT legal because they
departed from MFN treatment in GATT, Article I without meeting the
requirements of Article XXIV.187
In 2001 the WTO Ministers authorized a waiver for the trade
provisions of the Cotonou Agreement effective through 2007, which
everyone understood would not be renewed.188 Thus, the goal for both
the EU and the ACP states was a series of EPAs that are considered
legal under GATT Article XXIV. The EU decided in consultation with
the ECP states that the trade preference provisions of the Cotonou
Agreement would have to be replaced with new arrangements that
would be GATT-legal, using Cotonou as the "foundation" for such
discussions. 1 8 9 Failing agreement the ACP exports to the EU would, as
of January 1, 2008, benefit only from the Generalized System of
Preferences rather than from the superior preferential access under
Cotonou. 190 The impact of this change on ACP states would not have
been uniform. The least developed developing states, mostly in Africa,
would have had duty-free access to the EU market for "everything but
arms," and thus would not have seen enormous differences in market
184. See Bartels, supra note 181, at 722-29 (discussing the Yaounde Conventions and
the GATT Article XXIV legality questions).
185. See id. at 733, 739.
186. Id. at 733.
187. Id. at 734-36.
188. World Trade Organization, Doha Ministerial Decision 2001: European
Communities - The ACP-EC Partnership Agreement, WT/MIN(01)/15, 41 I.L.M. 767
(2001).
189. See Bartels, supra note 181, at 716. Non-trade related provisions of Cotonou
remain effective until 2020.
190. Economic Partnership Agreement: Schedule of Negotiations, CARIBBEAN REG'L
NEGOTIATING MACHINERY (Oct. 29, 2007), http://www.crnm.org/index.php?option=com-
content&view=article&catid=187:rnm-updates-for-2007&id=170:rnm-update-0714 (noting
that without an economic partnership agreement in place by January 1, 2008 the region
would be in a "disadvantageous position").
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access compared to Cotonou. However, for "middle income" Caribbean
states (all except Haiti) and many African nations, the EU GSP
benefits1 91 would have been considerably less favorable than those
available under Cotonou or under a new EPA. 192
For the EU, the focus has shifted toward a greater level of
reciprocity, while continuing the emphasis on development. As EU
Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson affirmed in April 2008 (while
defending the EPA negotiations against criticism), "the whole idea of
the EPA is to harness trade in the cause of development, to create
opportunities for trade linked to capacity building and development
cooperation, which offers a much better deal than the old-style tariff
preferences of Cotonou."1 93
The EU's efforts to complete negotiations with all ACP nations by
the end of 2007 were not successful except with respect to the
Caribbean nations. 194 In several situations the EU concluded interim
EPAs (covering only trade in goods), accords which left many details to
be negotiated until later, and/or did not cover services, intellectual
property, or government procurement.195 Still, the ACP nations have
continued to receive "duty free, quota free" (DFQF) access to the EU
market.196 This approach is ending; the EU indicated in September
2011 that as of January 1, 2014, those ACP countries that had not
concluded and ratified an EPA would lose their DFQF access. 197
Possibly, the absence of negotiations in Geneva will assist at least some
ACP nations in completing the EPA negotiations by 2014. It also seems
likely that in the absence of another broad negotiating round in Geneva
the EU and the ACP states will continue to develop the trade
relationships that are the subject of the EPAs.
191. See Generalized System of Preferences 2006-2008, EUROPA (last updated June 22,
2007), http://europa.eulegislation-summaries/external trade/ri1020_en.htm.
192. See id.
193. Mathabo le Roux, Tricky Trade Negotiations Need More Discussion, ALL AFRICA
(Apr. 8, 2008), http://allafrica.com/stories/200804080659.html.
194. See Bruce Zagaris & Elena Papangelopoulou, An Overview of the CARIFORUM-
EC Economic Partnership Agreement, 49 TAx NOTES INT'L 689 (Feb. 25, 2008); Gantz-
RTAs, supra note 127, at 349-59.
195. Luisa Morgantini, EU-ACP Trade - Unequal Partners, Unfair Rules, ALL AFRICA
(Dec. 26, 2007), http://allafrica.comistories/printable/200712260449.html.
196. EC Proposes January 2014 as Deadline for Completion of EPA Process, CTA
AGRITRADE (Oct. 20, 2011), http://agritrade.cta.int/en/layout/set/print/Agriculture/
Topics/EPAs/EC-proposes-January-20 14-as-deadline-for-completion-of-EPA-process.
197. Int'l Center for Trade and Sustainable Development, Special Update: European
Commission Puts Renewed Pressure on EPA Negotiations, TRADE NEGOTIATIONS INSIGHTS
(Oct. 2011), http://ictsd.org/i/news/tni/115406/.
354 VOL. 40:1-3
WORLD TRADE LAW AFTER DOHA
2. Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Other United States
Initiatives
The two-year-old negotiations aimed at a Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP) agreement (Australia, Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand,
Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam) represent the only
major Obama Administration trade initiative (beyond the enactment in
October 2011 of long-stalled Bush era FTAs with Colombia, Panama,
and South Korea).s98 After nine rounds of talks despite some progress
no consensus has been reached on the difficult issues, including some
that have eluded negotiators in Geneva, such as increased protection of
intellectual property ("TRIPS-plus"), investment, competition, and
market access in sensitive goods and services sectors such as certain
industrial goods, agriculture, and textiles. New language to regulate
behavior of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is being proposed by the
United States for the comprehensive FTA, along with the labor and
environmental provisions that are politically required in any United
States FTA.199 Agreement even on the "broad outlines of a final pact"
will not likely be reached for some time, and much hard negotiating
remains. 200
The potential expansion of world trade likely to result from a TPP
with the current nine nation negotiating group is modest, given that the
United States already has free trade agreements in force with four of
the TPP group (Australia, Chile, Peru, and Singapore) and Brunei,
Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore are currently parties to the "P4"
FTA with each other. 201 However, many of the negotiators hope that
the TPP could ultimately serve as the foundation for a much broader
Free Trade Agreement of the Asia-Pacific; as the Chilean negotiator,
Rodrigo Contreras observed, "[o]ur objectives are to negotiate the
highest quality agreement and set the foundation for an Asia-Pacific
Agreement." 202 For example, should Japan ultimately decide to join the
TPP negotiations or sign on later-preliminary steps to that end began
198. See Rachel Boehm, Obama Signs Robust Trade Package Implementation: TPP
Next for U.S. Trade, 28 INT'L REP. (BNA) 1735 (2011).
199. See U.S. Fixes Future-SOE "Loophole," Sends TPP Partners Proposed Text, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE'S WORLD TRADE ONLINE (Oct. 21, 2011), http://wtonewsstand.com/Inside-US-
Trade/Inside-U.S.-Trade- 10/21/201 1/menu-id-445.html.
200. See Len Bracken, Marantis Says Trade Deal Votes Validate Consultative
Approach being Used with TPP, 28 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1707 (2011) (quoting Deputy
U.S.T.R. Demetrios Marantis).
201. See U.S. Free Trade Agreements, EXPORT.GOV (last updated Apr. 26, 2011),
http://export.gov/FTA/index.asp; Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement Negotiations,
AUSTRALIAN GOV'T DEP'T OF FOREIGN AFF. AND TRADE, http://www.dfat.gov.aulfta/tpp/
index.html.
202. Lucien 0. Chavin, Ninth Round of TPP Talks Concludes in Lima; U.S. Tables
State-Owned Enterprise Proposal, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA), Oct. 31, 2011, at D10.
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in November 2011203 - the economic equation would radically change,
as United States Congressional leaders have cautioned. 204 Similarly,
the addition of Canada and Mexico would also greatly increase the
economic significance of the TPP,205 as well as the negotiating
challenges. Trade expert Gary Horlick, a strong proponent of an
expanded TPP, suggested that such a TPP might be a workable
alternative for the members to the WTO.206 China has indicated that it
might be willing eventually to take part,207 but China's presence would
not likely be welcomed in the United States.
One hopes that the TPP negotiations can be successfully concluded,
although this is not likely to occur before 2013 at the earliest, despite
President Obama's expressed hope for a mid-2012 finalization. 2 08 The
pace of the negotiations has been slow; the United States presidential
election and other political constraintS209 along with the added
complexities of Japanese participation make this an extremely difficult
process. Still, if the agreement is concluded promptly, this, plus the
absence of negotiations in Geneva, might well convince other Asia
Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) nations to participate
with the United States. With Japan, Canada, and Mexico incorporated
into the TPP - a further complicating and possibly delaying factor -
203. Japan Gov't Confirms Step Towards TPP Deal Despite Opposition,
ENGLISH.NEWS.CN (Nov. 11, 2011), http://news.xinhuanet.comlenglish2010/world/2011-
11/11/c_131242055.htm (reporting on the prime minister's decision to enter into
consultations).
204. Congressional Leaders Caution USTR on Possibility of Japan Joining TPP,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE'S WORLD TRADE ONLINE (Nov. 9, 2011), http://inside
trade.com/201111092381649/WTO-Daily-News/Daily-News/congressional-leaders-caution-
ustr-on-possibility-of-japan-joining-tpp/menu-id-173.html. The U.S. auto industry likely
would be opposed. U.S. Auto Companies Oppose Japanese Participation in TPP
Negotiations, INSIDE U.S. TRADE'S WORLD TRADE ONLINE (Nov. 11, 2011),
http://insidetrade.com/201111112382030/WTO-Daily-News/Daily-News/us-auto-companie
s-oppose-japanese-participation-in-tpp-negotiations/menu-id- 173.html.
205. Len Bracken, Nine Leaders Agree on Outline for TPP; Canada, Mexico Follow
Japan in Bid to Join, 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1858 (Nov. 17, 2011).
206. Davies, supra note 5.
207. Daniel Pruzin & Len Bracken, Official Says China 'Open' to Participation in
Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations, 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1566 (Sept. 29, 2011).
208. White House Eyes Mid-2012 TPP Deal, Cautious On Prospect of Japan Joining
Talks, INSIDE U.S. TRADE'S WORLD TRADE ONLINE (Nov. 13, 2011),
http://insidetrade.com/201111142382142/WTO-Daily-News/Daily-News/white-house-eyes-
mid-20 12-tpp-deal-cautious-on-prospect-of-japan-joining-talks/menu-id- 173.html.
209. These include the President's current lack of trade promotion authority, although
Deputy U.S.T.R. Marantis has argued that extensive consultations between the Obama
Administration and Congress on the TPP have obviated the need at the present time for
TPA. Bracken, supra note 200. Another political constraint overshadowing the TPP
negotiations disappeared in October 2011, when the long-stalled U.S. FTAs with
Colombia, Panama and South Korea were approved. Rachel Boehm, Bilateral
Agreements: Obama Signs Robust Trade Package Implementation; TPP Next for U.S.
Trade, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (Oct. 24, 2011).
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the agreement would rival the EU among regional trade agreements in
terms of total trade.
3. An EU-United States FTA?
Should there be a political opportunity for true boldness, the
concept of a United States-EU trade agreement may again surface.
The logic of a comprehensive free trade agreement between the United
States and the EU, perhaps parallel to the ongoing negotiations (since
2009) of such an agreement between the EU and Canada, 210 is
unassailable given the enormous volume of bilateral trade. 211 The
options range from relatively narrow coverage - perhaps of services,
investment, and competition law - to an agreement that would cover
manufactured goods as well, to a fully comprehensive agreement that
would also address agricultural trade, investment, competition law and
the like. 212
The obstacles are enormous as well, particularly in the GATT
requirement that it apply to "substantially all trade" including
agriculture and the political and economic imperative to apply to major
services sectors. The fact that Canada, a nation of less than 35 million
people with a GDP about 5 percent of that of the United States, 213 may
be able to successfully negotiate such an agreement doesn't mean the
same is true for the United States. Moreover, issues such as
agricultural subsidies, agricultural trade, investment, and competition
have proven daunting for the United States and the EU nations to
address in the past.214  The enormous volume of WTO litigation
210. Peter Menyasz, Bilateral Agreements: Services, Investment Offers Exchanged in
Latest Round of Canada-EU Trade Talks, 28 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1756 (Oct. 27,
2011). EU-Canada trade was C$82.5 billion in 2010.
211. In 2010, U.S. exports to the EU were approximately $240 million worth, while
imports were worth $319 billion, for total trade in goods of $559 million. Trade in Goods
with the European Union, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/foreign-
trade/balance/c0003.html#2010 (last visited Oct. 29, 2011).
212. See Chamber of Commerce Eyes Expansion of U.S.-EU 'Zero-Tariff' Concept,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE'S WORLD TRADE ONLINE (Oct. 27, 2011), http://insidetrade.com/Inside-
US-Trade/Inside-U.S.-Trade- 10/28/201 1/chamber-of-commerce-eyes-expansion-of-us-eu-
zero-tariff-concept/menu-id-7 (discussing various Chamber of Commerce proposals for a
trade deal with the EU).
213. World Economic Outlook Database, September 2011: Report for Selected Countries
and Subjects, INT'L MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/02/
weodatalweorept.aspx?sy=2009&ey=2016&scsm=l&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=
156&s=NGDPD%2CNGDPDPC%2CPPPGDP%2CPPPPC%2CLP&grp=0&a=&prl.x=94&
prl.y=17 (last visited Jan. 23, 2012); GDP (Current US $), WORLD BANK,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD (last visited Jan. 23, 2012).
214. See, e.g., the failed negotiations at the OECD of a "multilateral investment
agreement" in the 1990s, supra notes 101-102 and accompanying text.
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between the United States and the EU is also notable. 215 Perhaps the
Doha failure in time will encourage the United States and the EU to
consider an agreement of limited scope that nonetheless would result in
significant trade expansion while still being WTO legal, 216 rather than
insisting on a fully comprehensive FTA. Following a November 2011
EU-United States summit, the EU and the United States committed to
seeking new ways to increase bilateral trade and investment by the end
of 2012,217 possibly including an FTA. 2 18
C. Services RTAs
The objective of the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS) 2 19 is simple: over time, to assure that the basic disciplines that
have applied to international trade in non-agricultural products for
more than half century - MFN treatment, national treatment,
subsidies, transparency, etc. - are applied to services, with a minimum
of exceptions. 220  GATS provides a series of legal rules governing
market access and MFN and national treatment restrictions. GATS
rules apply to regional and local as well as national governments. 221
Members of the WTO agree through a "positive list" approach to restrict
use of market access and national treatment restrictions; obligations
under GATS, except as noted below, are defined largely by Members'
individual schedules of commitments. National treatment
commitments are limited by each government to the services
specifically designated by that government in its individual annexes. 222
GATS also required the members, beginning in 2000, to enter into
"successive rounds of negotiations . . . with a view to achieving a
progressively higher level of liberalization." 2 2 3 Unfortunately, little
215. Since 1995, the EU had brought 29 WTO actions against the United States, and
the United States had brought 24 actions against the EU or individual members.
Chronological List of Disputes Cases, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop.e/dispu-e/dispu-statuse.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2012).
216. For example, a services bilateral agreement need only meet the requirements of
GATS, art. VI, discussed in subsection C, below; agreements on most investment issues
and competition law would be totally outside of WTO scope.
217. EU, U.S. to Explore Deeper Bilateral Economic Ties by End of 2012, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE'S WORLD TRADE ONLINE (Nov. 28, 2011), http://insidetrade.com1201111
282383334/WTO-Daily-News/Daily-News/eu-us-to-explore-deeper-bilateral-economic-ties-
by-end-of-2012/menu-id- 173.html.
218. Kirk, Froman Say U.S.-EU FTA on the Table in New Working Group, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE'S WORLD TRADE ONLINE (Nov. 30, 2011), http://insidetrade.com/201111
302383537/WTO-Daily-News/Daily-News/kirk-froman-say-us-eu-fta-on-the-table-in-new-
working-group/menu-id- 173.html.
219. GATS, supra note 111, art. I.
220. Id. art. II, art. III.
221. Id. art. I.
222. Id. art. XX.
223. Id. art. XIX, §1.
358 VOL. 40:1-3
WORLD TRADE LAW AFTER DOHA
progress has been made in the Doha services negotiations, particularly
since 2008.224 Given that the services negotiations have been part of
the Doha Round "single undertaking," the effective abandonment of the
Doha Round means that services liberalization is also abandoned or
indefinitely delayed in Geneva.
Because of the MFN provisions, plurilateral agreements on services
are generally impractical; concessions among a few would automatically
apply to other WTO members, including those who did not participate
in the negotiations or make concessions of their own. However, GATS
Article V contains language similar to that of GATT, Article XXIV:
1. This Agreement shall not prevent any of its Members from
being a party to or entering into an agreement liberalizing
trade in services between or among the parties to such an
agreement, provided that such an agreement:
(a) has substantial sectoral coverage, 225 and
(b) provides for the absence or elimination of substantially all
discrimination, in the sense of Article XVII, between or among
the parties, in the sectors covered under subparagraph (a),
through:
(i) elimination of existing discriminatory measures, and/or
(ii) prohibition of new or more discriminatory measures,
either at the entry into force of that agreement or on the
basis of a reasonable time-frame . . . .226
Although it is evident from Article V(2) that the Parties
contemplated situations in which trade in services would typically be
part of a broader RTA on goods,227 this is one factor to be considered
rather than an absolute requirement. In other words, a freestanding
services RTA or "economic integration agreement" (EIA) is
permissible. 228  Nor is there a requirement that substantially all
224. See Services: Negotiations State of Play, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/serv-e/state-of-play-e.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2011)
(noting with typical understatement that "Progress has been limited since the Signaling
Conference of July 2008).
225. "This condition is understood in terms of number of sectors, volume of trade
affected and modes of supply. In order to meet this condition, agreements should not
provide for the a priori exclusion of any mode of supply." GATS, supra note 111, art. V
n. 1.
226. Id. art. V, §1.
227. In the WTO's evaluation of the agreement "consideration may be given to the
relationship of the agreement to a wider process of economic integration or trade
liberalization among the countries concerned." Id. art. V, §2.
228. It is the responsibility of the Council for Trade in Services to determine if a
services RTA is consistent with GATS Article V. However, given the unlikelihood that the
Council, like the CRTA, could reach a consensus on the legality or illegality of a services
RTA, the risks are minimal.
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services trade be covered (as with goods in GATT, Article XXIV); rather
only "substantial sectoral coverage is mandated. 229 This GATS Article
V approach for EIAs is clearly far more flexible than a traditional
"plurilateral" agreement which could not avoid the MFN questions.
GATS Article V thus provides a potentially powerful mechanism for
services trade liberalization among those who are willing to liberalize
services market access among a group of WTO Members even if they
are reluctant to open their services markets more broadly. As one
scholar suggested several years ago:
EIAs [economic integrations agreements] may not only revive
negotiations among interested countries, but also offer a
sensible way to account for different levels of Members'
technological and infrastructural development. For example,
India may find an EIA with the U.S., EU, or OCED, whether
concluded cumulatively or individually, accelerating its
development. The same could be said in the case of Brazil. As a
method of distancing service negotiations from negotiations on
agriculture and non-agriculture market access, an EIA could
enable a closer cooperation between the U.S. and EU. An EIA
could also induce trade among the members of the Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development.230
Services EIA negotiations already are being pursued in a
preliminary fashion by the United States, the EU, and other OECD
members, and the group will hopefully by some developing countries in
the coming months. The focus will be on most of the same issues as at
Geneva, such as market opening, domestic regulation, rules on the use
of emergency safeguards, services subsidies, and possibly rules for least
developed countries. 231  A major objective is to expand individual
country commitments to services market liberalization. 232
V. NATIONAL LAW
Despite much less attention internationally than is the case with
multilateral trade negotiations, a very substantial portion of the
increase in world trade in recent decades has resulted not from
229. GATT, supra note 68, art. XXIV, §1; GATS, supra note 111, art. V, §1.
230. Petra L. Emerson, An Economic Integration Agreement on Services: A Possible
Solution to the Doha Development Round Impasse, 2 TRADE L. & DEV. 252, 252-53 (2010).
231. Services Negotiations, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e
/serv els-negs-e.htm#offers (last visited Oct. 25, 2011) (listing the major areas of
negotiations); see WTO Members Brainstorm Services Plurilateral Options, No Decision
Yet, World Trade On-Line, Feb. 24, 2012 (reporting on the continuing discussions).
Government procurement of services is related, but generally addressed along with goods
in the GPA negotiations discussed in Part III(B)(1), above.
232. GATS, supra note 111, art. XIX ("negotiation of specific commitments").
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multilateral or even regional trade agreements, but through unilateral
national actions to lower tariffs, reduce non-tariff barriers, and/or make
international commerce operate more smoothly. Several World Bank
scholars have estimated that during the period 1983-2003, "autonomous
changes in national law were responsible for the overwhelming majority
(roughly 66 percent)" of trade liberalization in developing countries. 233
In this section I consider several important examples of the power and
reach of unilateral action through national legislation alone-the
country-specific actions of Chile and Mexico, the individual actions of
many countries under the 'Washington Consensus" and the use of
uniform law to implement necessary change, such multilateral efforts
at the Organization of American States (OAS) and UNCITRAL to offer
model laws for secured financing.
A. Chile
As the government has explained,
Chile's applied MFN tariff was unilaterally phased down from 11
per cent to six per cent between 1999 and 2003.234 . . . This low and
uniform tariff is a distinctive feature of Chile's trade policy that
makes for more efficient resource allocation by establishing the
basis for non-differential treatment of the various production
sectors, and has also enabled Chile to negotiate preferential
agreements with various countries. 235
Since 2003 Chile has continued to apply the single MFN tariff
rate of 6 percent, with a few exceptions. 236 As the Chilean
Government confirmed in a 2009 WTO report, Chile's trade
policy maintains its objective of improving and ensuring access
for its goods and services to all markets, as well as encouraging
domestic and foreign investment. With a view to liberalizing
the economy, all available channels have been used to give
Chile's trade policy an outward orientation, including unilateral
market opening and multilateral and bilateral trade
negotiations. 237
The advantages of this tariff policy are substantial. First, it has
greatly simplified the classification process for business stakeholders
233. Dadush, supra note 8, at 2 (citing a study by Will Martin and Francis Ng of the
World Bank).
234. Trade Policy Review Body Rep., Trade Policy Review-Report by Chile, 21,
WT/TPR/G/220 (Sept. 2, 2009), available at www.wto.org/englishl/tratop-e/tpr e/g220-
e.doc.
235. Id.
236. WTO Secretariat, Trade Policy Review-Chile, T 10, WT/TPR/S/220 (Sept. 2,
2009), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/tpr-e/tp320_e.htm.
237. Trade Policy Review Body Rep, supra note 234, 20.
3612012
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
and the customs service alike, since the tariff rate is the same
regardless of how the goods are classified under the tariff schedules.
Secondly, it greatly reduced the likelihood of customs fraud-an
endemic problem in many developing countries-because an importer
receives no financial advantage by seeking the fraudulent
reclassification of goods to her advantage. 238
B. Mexico Before and After NAFTA
Mexico began liberalizing its economy in 1985 in preparation for
accession to GATT in 1986, and has continued the process (with more
than a few ups and downs and many delays) since that time. 2 3 9 Much of
Mexico's reform legislation was mandated by NAFTA, such as the 1993
Foreign Investment Law. 2 40 However, that law, like many others, was
applied from the outset by Mexico in a non-discriminatory manner to
persons of other nationalities investing in Mexico, and that practice has
not changed in more than eighteen years. In 2011, despite some
continuing complexities in the system, Mexico is considered by the
World Bank to be the easiest place in Latin America to do business and
35th in the world. 241  Mexico's future, perhaps more than most
countries given the enormous comparative advantages it received with
NAFTA, depends today as it did a decade ago more on its ability to
bring about internal reforms than from gains it has reason to expect
from new trade agreements. As the WTO Secretariat observed in 2008:
Since its previous Review in 2002, Mexico has continued with
the gradual and unilateral liberalization of its trade regime. It
has also concluded new free-trade agreements, now conducting
85 per cent of its trade with preferential partners . . . At the
same time, some barriers to MFN trade and foreign investment
limit the access of Mexican consumers and producers to certain
goods and services on more competitive terms. 242
238. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE
DEVELOPMENT DIMENSIONS OF TRADE 57 (2001); David G. Tarr, On the Design of Tariff






239. Carol Wise, Mexico's Democratic Transition: the Search for New Reform
Coalitions, 9 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 283, 291-92 (2003).
240. Mexico: Foreign Investment Act of 1993, Dec. 27, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 207 (1993).
241. Making the Desert Bloom; Mexico's Economy, ECONOMIST, Aug. 27, 2011, at 59
[hereinafter Economist-Mexico].
242. WTO Secretariat, Trade Policy Review-Mexico, 1, WT/TPR/S/195 (Jan. 7,
2008), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/tpr-e/tp295 e.htm.
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Despite significant improvements in recent years, Mexico continues
to suffer in the areas of energy costs, education, tax inequality, legal
system inefficiency, and corruption, among others. 243 Still, particularly
in recent years, Mexico is an example of the power of internal,
unilateral, legislative reforms that could be instructive to other nations.
C. The "Washington Consensus"
The "Washington Consensus" is the term commonly given to the
post-Cold War program urged on the developing world beginning
around 1990.244 The essence of the Washington Consensus was
deregulation, along with a package of liberal economic, legal, and
political reforms that emphasized democracy through free elections.
These changes were to be accompanied by balanced budgets, a smaller
state sector, and privatization of the national economy. 245 Critics have
charged that the program was imposed without regard to individual
country and citizen needS24 6 and others have blamed it (probably
unfairly) for the Argentine financial collapse. 247
However, to the extent that the Washington Consensus stands for
healthy, democratic institutions, less (but not an absence of) regulation,
reduced corruption, and emphasis on internal reforms rather than
outside assistance, it seems very much alive, as the experience of both
Mexico and Chile confirms. 248 The Peruvian economist, Hernando de
Soto, postulated that poor countries could benefit from globalization
only if they reform their regulatory institutions, with the objective of
reducing or eliminating unnecessary barriers to entry for local
entrepreneurs. 249
The George W. Bush Administration created the Millennium
Challenge Corporation (MCC), which provides financial aid only to
243. See Wise, supra note 239, at 305-10 (discussing Mexico's needs, inter alia, for tax
reform, investment in education and human capital, reform of labor markets and reform
of the tax system, including dependence on oil revenues); Gantz-RTAs, supra note 127, at
156-57 (discussing the continuing need for internal reforms in Mexico).
244. Thomas Kelley, Beyond the Washington Consensus and New Institutionalism:
What is the Future of Law and Development, 35 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 539, 542
(2010).
245. Id.
246. John Williamson, Preface: A Short History of the Washington Consensus, 15 LAW
& Bus. REV. AM. 7, 12-13 (2009).
247. See id. at 13 (contending that the Argentine collapse was caused by a fixed,
chronically overvalued exchange rate and an excessive debt/GDP ratio).
248. Kelley, supra note 244, at 542; Marcos Aurelio Pereira Valadao, Legal and
Institutional Dimensions of Reform: Washington Consensus and Latin America
Integration: MERCOSUR and the Road to Regional Inconsistencies-to Where are We
Going Exactly?, 15 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 207, 209 (2009).
249. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN
THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 210-11, 227 (2000).
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lower middle income developing countries which bring about certain
internal reforms that are considered vital to sustainable economic
growth and development, including providing legal and financial
support for small and medium-sized businesses and strengthening and
improving government institutions. 2 5 0 Before a country is eligible the
candidate country's performance on various policy indicators is
examined, with those selected being based on policy performance. 251
Those countries that are chosen must "identify their priorities for
achieving sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction." 252 The
MCC requires that individual country proposals be developed in
consultation with civil society and provide consultations with the
countries to help them develop and refine their programs. 253 As
Professor Thomas Kelly observed, funds are not made available by the
MCC until after the country "has demonstrated progress in institution-
building." 254
President Obama, in his first year in office, affirmed his support for
strong institutions rather than "strongmen," in a major speech in
Ghana. 255 As of December 2011, the program continues without major
changes under the Obama Administration. 2 5 6 The selected countries
include Honduras, whose secured financing legislation and registry
were supported by the MCC. 2 5 7
It is impossible to predict in this time of unacceptable budget
deficits whether the United States, the EU and other developed
countries will continue to provide existing levels of foreign assistance
and funding for the international development banks. However, it
seems likely that such assistance will be provided only under conditions
in which the donors believe it will be effective. Consequently,
developing nations which take the steps that are necessary in order to
create improved conditions for economic development, even if there is
less knee-jerk deregulation and more institution-building, are most
likely to prosper.
250. About MCC, MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION, http://www.mcc.gov/




254. Kelley, supra note 244, at 547.
255. Id. at 540.
256. Press Release: President Obama Requests $1.125 Billion for MCC to Continue
Innovative Approach to Development Assistance, MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION
(Feb. 15, 2011), http://www.mcc.gov/pages/press/release/release-021411-presidentoba
marequests.
257. About MCC, supra note 250.
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D. Model Laws: Secured Transactions
Another approach that falls within the gambit of national
legislation is the practice of drafting models laws for adoption by the
states participating in the multilateral organizations, such as the
United Nations Committee on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
and the Committee on Private International Law at the Organization of
American States. By definition, such model laws are for the willing; no
members of the drafting organizations are ever required to adopt the
laws, although competitive pressures in neighboring countries, for the
foreign investment dollar, may make such reforms less "voluntary" than
would otherwise be the case. 2 5 8 Versions of the 2002 OAS model
secured transactions laW2 5 9 have been adopted in one form or another
in Mexico, Honduras and Guatemala. 260 Internal deliberations among
government officials, banks and potential borrowers are underway at
this writing in Colombia, Malawi, and Uganda. 261 The successor to the
UNCITRAL working group that was responsible for the UNCITRAL
Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions 262 is drafting a new secured
transactions law, one that is likely to have appeal well beyond Latin
America and which is expected to facilitate implementation of the
necessary reforms, facilitating the availability of secured credit for
small and medium-sized business in the developing world. 263
E. Unilateral Reduction of Agricultural Subsidies in the EU and
United States?
Historically, reduction of agricultural subsidies has been one of the
most difficult aspects of international trade negotiations. EU
reluctance to decrease agricultural subsidies almost derailed the
258. GERARD MCCORMACK, SECURED CREDIT AND THE HARMONISATION OF LAW: THE
UNCITRAL EXPERIENCE 177 (2011).
259. Model Inter-American Law on Secured Transactions, ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN
STATES, http://www.oas.org/dil/cidip-vi-securedtransactions-eng.htm (last visited Oct. 20,
2011).
260. Secured Transactions, NATIONAL LAW CENTER FOR INTER-AMERICAN FREE TRADE,
http://natlaw.com/projects/securedtrans.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2012); MCC is Increasing
Access to Credit Through a Movable Property Registry in Honduras, MILLENNIUM
CHALLENGE CORPORATION (Mar. 28, 2011), www.mcc.gov/.. /press/results-2011002055401-
hondurascredit.pdf.
261. Julian Davis Mortenson, The Meaning of 'Investment': ICSID's Travaux and the
Domain of International Investment Law, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. 257, 264-65, 292 (2010).
262. U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON SECURED
TRANSACTIONS: TERMINOLOGY AND RECOMMENDATIONS, U.N. Sales No. E.09.V.13 (2009)
available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/security-lg/e/Terminology-and-
Recs.18-1-10.pdf.
263. This section is based on discussions with Boris Kozolchyk and Marek Dubovec
who have been working with various Latin American and African governments on secured
transactions legislation and the accompanying electronic registry systems since the mid-
1990s. Mr. Dubovec is a member of the UNCITRAL Working Group VI.
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Uruguay Round negotiations in 1992, but the impasse was ultimately
resolved through the "Blair House Accord." 26 4  As noted earlier,
opposition to further reductions in agricultural subsidies contributed
significantly to the demise of the Doha Round. Under such
circumstances it may be considered strange to suggest that either the
United States or the EU would consider reducing their agricultural
subsidies on a unilateral basis. Nevertheless, particularly when one is
considering the longer-term, this may be possible. The reason will
likely have little to do with international trade negotiations per se.
Rather, it will be a result of budgetary constraints and the increasing
importance of environmentally sound farming. The EC, which devoted
almost 44 percent of the EU budget to agricultural support in 2007,265
already has decided to freeze the budget in absolute numbers for seven
years beginning in 2012 at about 36 percent of the total. 2 6 6 The EU
agricultural commissioner noted in October 2011 that "[t]he next
decades will be crucial for laying the foundations of a strong agriculture
sector that can cope with climate change and international competition
while meeting the expectations of the citizen."2 6 7 Continuing financial
pressures on the EU as a result of fiscal crises in Greece, Spain,
Portugal, Ireland, and elsewhere may accelerate this trend, despite the
risk that reducing farm supports could further exacerbate economic
problems in some of the EU's more vulnerable economies. 268
The prognosis for reduced farm subsidies in the United States is
much less clear. Financial constraints in the coming years have
increased pressures to reduce agricultural subsidies, 269 either as part of
the ongoing super committee process or through continuing demands to
reduce the budget deficit, including but not limited to actions by a re-
elected or new President and Congress in 2013. However, the strength
of the farm lobby within Congress, and particularly within the United
States Senate, is such that substantial reductions, at least in the short
264. KEVIN C. KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION: READINGS, CASES,
NOTES AND PROBLEMS 15 (2009).
265. European Comm'n Agriculture and Rural Dev., Fact Sheet: Managing the
Agricultural Budget Wisely (2007), 3, http://ec.europa.eulagriculture/fin/clearance/
factsheet-en.pdf.
266. EU farm budget frozen for next seven years and conditioned to 'greening,'
MERCOPRESS (July 1, 2011), http://en.mercopress.com/2011/07/01/eu-farm-budget-frozen-
for-next-seven-years-and-conditioned-to-greening.
267. Joe Kirwin, EC Proposes Radical Reforms to Agricultural Subsidy Program, 28
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1698 (Oct. 20, 2011) (quoting Commissioner Dacian Ciolos).
268. Claire Schaffnit-Chatterjee, Risk Management in Agriculture: Towards Market
Solutions in the EU, DEUTSCHE BANK RESEARCH (2010), http://www.dbresearch.com/
PROD/DBR INTERNETENPROD/PROD0000000000262553.PDF.
269. See Farm Bill Proposals Foresee Elimination or Cuts for Direct Payments, CCPs,
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to medium term, may be elusive. Still, the major United States
subsidies and other protective measures provided to the ethanol
industry, including a tariff of 54 cents per gallon, were allowed by the
United States Congress to expire at the end of 2011.270
VI. CONCLUSIONS
While multilateral trade negotiations may well be the most
economically sound route to the reduction of tariffs and non-tariff
barriers for agricultural and manufactured goods and increased market
access for services, among others, in the absence of the political will
among WTO Members to move forward, other options are likely to
become more popular. Most observers would agree that some trade
liberalization is better than no trade liberalization, or increased
protection. The vehicles for "some liberalization" include new or
expanded regional trade agreements, "plurilateral" accords among a
willing sub-group of the WTO memberships, and increased attention as
to how members can increase their own competitiveness and trade
through changes in national laws and policies. 271 None of these are
mutually exclusive. There are risks in all of these alternatives, but the
failure of Doha has given members who seek expanded trade and the
benefits accruing therefrom no other choice.
270. Felicia Sonmez, Lawmakers Call for Repeal of Ethanol Subsidies, WASHINGTON
POST (Dec. 12, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/2chambers/post/lawmakers-
call-for-repeal-of-ethanol-subsidies/2011/12/12/gIQAVq6KqO blog.html; Robert Pear,
After Three Decades, Tax Credit for Ethanol Expires, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/02/business/energy-environment/after-three-decades-
federal-tax-credit-for-ethanol-expires.html.
271. Kelley, supra note 244, at 541.
2012 367
